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Learning About Schooling:
The Effects of State Level Student Achievement Data on Public Opinion
There is a growing literature on the effects of student achievement data on public opinion.
Prior research suggests that individuals tend to overestimate student achievement in their
area. The provision of current achievement levels tends to cause a decrease in confidence
in the public schools. In some cases, it appears to increase support for various education
reforms. However, previous experimental studies measured outcomes immediately after the
provision of information about education performance, making it difficult to distinguish be-
tween long-lasting information effects and the more ephemeral consequences of priming. As
a result, we do not know how large these effects truly are nor how long they last. I address
these concerns by conducting a survey experiment in which I provide state level student
achievement data to a randomly assigned treatment group and then measure political at-
titudes on education issues at three separate times: immediately, after one day, and after
ten days. There is evidence that the provision of state level student achievement data tem-
porarily reduces individuals’ confidence in their state school systems, but this effect does not
persist after ten days.
Schoolhouse Democracy: Education Policy Responsiveness in the States
The link between public opinion and enacted public policy is referred to as policy respon-
siveness in the political science literature. Using new estimates of state level public opinion,
I explore the relationship between support for increased education spending and average per
pupil expenditures at the state level from 1984 to 2013. Within a given year, I find a modest,
positive relationship between statewide public opinion on education spending and statewide
per pupil expenditures. On average, states with greater support for education spending also
tend to spend more per pupil. Within states over time, an increase in support for greater
education spending is also associated with an increase in actual spending. However, after
controlling for both between-state differences and common trends across states over time,
I observe a negative relationship between public opinion and education spending levels. In
circumstances in which spending levels are low relative to the state average and low relative
to the year average, support for increased education spending tends to be high for that state
and year. Additionally, education spending responsiveness tends to be worse in states with
weak or non-existent teachers unions.
Polarization and the Politics of Education: What Moves Partisan Opinion?
This study explores the conditions under which partisan polarization and de-polarization
occur with respect to public opinion on education issues. To guide this investigation, I
pose three general questions. First, does the provision of policy-relevant information cause
partisans to converge on the same position? Second, can signals from political elites with
ideologically moderate views move partisans closer together? And third, does direct experi-
ence with public schools reduce the political abstraction with which one evaluates education
policies? I repurpose and extend 17 existing survey experiments to help answer the first two
questions, and I conduct a non-experimental data analysis to investigate the third. I find
consistent evidence that the provision of education spending information has de-polarizing
consequences, but the effects of ideologically moderate elite signals on polarization vary by
year. I also find tentative evidence in favor of a link between direct experience with public
schools and reduced polarization on education issues.
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Preface
I know no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves; and
if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion,
the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion by education. This is
the true corrective of abuses of constitutional power.
Thomas Jefferson, 1820
Did you, too, O friend, suppose democracy was only for elections, for politics, and for a
party name? I say democracy is only of use there that it may pass on and come to its flower
and fruit in manners, in the highest forms of interaction between men, and their beliefs—in
religion, literature, colleges, and schools—democracy in all public and private life, and in the
army and navy.
Walt Whitman, 1871
In the relationship between education and democracy, we often think of schools as the
cradle of democratic values: the common meeting ground where social responsibility, civic-
mindedness, and tolerance are instilled in the next generation (Dewey 1916; Gutmann
1987). Jefferson’s sentiment, quoted above, captures the standard formulation: education
develops the knowledge and individual dispositions upon which democracy can thrive and
through which threats to democracy can be undermined. But the link between education
and democracy goes both ways. Schools do not just cultivate democratic values, they are
also the product of democratic pressures. Popularly elected governors, state legislatures,
ix
mayors, city councils, and school boards determine education budgets, set education policy,
and appoint top school administrators. Voters themselves often decide the fate of school
funding levies directly. Whitman reminds us that democracy is not merely the end to which
our collective efforts strive; it is also the means and the method that suffuses our institutions.
Like all public endeavors in a democratic society, public schooling is built upon and reflects
democratic systems, albeit imperfectly. The public schools are ultimately accountable to the
people to whom they belong.
Unfortunately for classical democratic theory, the will of the people with respect to
education is far from straightforward. There has never been one agreed upon and uncontested
purpose of the public schools. In his final annual report to the Massachusetts Board of
Education, Horace Mann ([1848] 1872) contends that the ideal system of public schooling
would not only develop individuals’ intellects but would also cultivate their physical, political,
moral, and religious capacities. The breadth of Mann’s vision only begins to capture the
many and various objectives of education that Americans have articulated and pursued since
the establishment of the first common schools. These goals have shifted over time—from the
mission to spread Biblical literacy in the nineteenth century to the emphasis on college and
career readiness based on math and reading achievement today—and each era has sown its
own dissent and produced its own counter-narratives on the purposes of schooling. Americans
have multiple and often conflicting beliefs about education that differ from person to person
and from year to year.
This dissertation takes aim at three distinct questions about Americans’ views on public
education. First, in this age of ubiquitous student achievement data, how do individuals
update their political opinions on education issues when they learn new information about
education performance? Second, are state school systems responsive to the education policy
preferences of their citizens? And third, how can we minimize the partisan polarization that
inhibits constructive debate on education issues? Over the course of three article-length
essays, my dissertation finds an empirical foothold in each of these large and unwieldy
x
debates. My objective has been to identify discrete and answerable research questions
that can move the scholarly discourse perceptibly forward. Using rigorous and replicable




The Effects of State Level Student
Achievement Data on Public Opinion
We live in an era of unprecedented access to public elementary and secondary student
achievement data. The education reforms prompted by the No Child Left Behind Act
of 2001, the Race to the Top competitive grant program of 2009, and the Every Student
Succeeds Act of 2015 have produced and maintained extensive district and state systems
for administering educational assessments. At the federal level, the U.S. Department of
Education conducts the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) every two
years. The education performance data collected from these tests are then disseminated
by local, state, and federal departments of education as well as by local and national news
outlets. They are also widely available on the web.
How do individuals respond to this influx of data? There is a burgeoning literature
on the effects of information about education performance on public opinion. Observational
studies indicate, unsurprisingly, that parents and the public as a whole are more satisfied with
higher performing schools and school systems (Charbonneau and Van Ryzin 2012; Chingos,
Henderson, and West 2012; Favero and Meier 2013; Jacobsen, Saultz, and Snyder 2013).
However, individuals tend to overestimate student performance in their area. Accordingly,
I would like to thank Jeffrey Henig, Priscilla Wohlstetter, Justin Phillips, Donald Green, Robert Shapiro,
and Robert Erikson for their guidance and thoughtful feedback. This research is supported by the National
Academy of Education/Spencer Dissertation Fellowship, the Teachers College Research Dissertation
Fellowship, and the Teachers College Department of Education Policy and Social Analysis. The data, code,
and pre-analysis plan for this study can be found on the Open Science Framework at https://osf.io/253fy/.
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the degree of satisfaction with local and state school systems appears to decline in response to
data on student achievement (Clinton and Grissom 2015; Elam 1995; Howell, Peterson, and
West 2009; Loveless 1997). Opinions on overall education spending, teacher pay, charter
schools, and other education policies may also be affected by the provision of student
achievement data and other policy-relevant information such as per pupil expenditures and
average teacher salaries. Upon receipt of such information, individuals appear to become
more supportive of changes to the current system. Broadly speaking, the existing set
of empirical studies on this issue suggests that the provision of information about school
expenditures and academic performance generates less support for government spending on
education and greater support for education reform policies such as charter schools, private
school tuition vouchers, and evaluating teachers based on student performance (Henderson,
Howell, and Peterson 2014; Schueler and West 2016; but see Clinton and Grissom 2015 for
a counter example in which student achievement data have no effect on support for various
education policies).
However, these initial findings conceal a number of unanswered questions. Few studies
have attempted to differentiate between the effects of acquiring new information (in which
individuals are presumably learning and subsequently altering their stances) and the more
ephemeral effects of priming (in which the invocation of an idea temporarily increases its
cognitive accessibility at the expense of other potentially relevant considerations). Relatedly,
there is an absence of research on the longevity of attitudinal changes on account of new
information. Although there is some indirect evidence that such information has lasting and
meaningful effects (see Hastings and Weinstein 2008 on school enrollment decisions), to date
there have been no attempts to quantify the duration and decay rate of these outcomes.
To address these gaps in the existing literature, I employ a survey experiment in
conjunction with a pair of short follow-up surveys on the same experimental subject pool.
In the initial survey, a randomly assigned treatment group receives their states’ eighth grade
math proficiency rates on the 2015 NAEP. Following the provision of treatment, I ask a series
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of questions about issues of education policy and state government. Unlike prior studies, I
also employ a follow-up survey to measure these political attitudes the next day. Whereas
priming effects tend to be short-lived, what remains of an information effect 24 hours later
should be distinct from the previous day’s prime. Lastly, I also conduct a second follow-up
survey after ten days, allowing me to identify whether or not the treatment effect persists
and, if so, how the magnitude of that effect changes over time.
The political implications of the current literature are unfavorable for traditional public
school systems. If the collection and distribution of student achievement data undermines
confidence in the public schools, decreases support for education spending, and increases
support for reforms like charters and vouchers that decentralize authority over schools, then
local and state education systems may be acting as the agents of their own demise. However,
if the effects postulated by the existing research are small and transitory—potentially mere
artifacts of the methodological context—then school systems can pursue policies oriented
around transparency and accountability without fear of aiding political challenges to their
legitimacy.
It is important to note that this experiment explores the effects of a single dose
of information at a single point in time. The study of the effects of changes in the
broader information environment, in which individuals receive ongoing exposure to new
data on student achievement, is more challenging to capture in a survey experimental
context. Nevertheless, this methodological approach also offers unique advantages. A
survey experiment all but ensures the receipt of the treatment, whereas information delivered
through traditional media outlets often fail to reach inattentive eyes and ears. My experiment
arguably allows for the estimation of the maximum possible effect of a single dose of
information. If treatment effect fade-out occurs quickly in this setting, the case for cumulative
effects over time becomes more difficult to make.
3
Literature Review
This line of research is rooted in the concept of information effects. Among political scientists,
there has been a long and distinguished inquiry into the effects of informational cues on
individuals’ attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Downs 1957; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Popkin
1991). When these cues take the form of descriptive data with the purpose of informing the
public about the nature of government activities, the consequences of these cues are known
as information effects (James 2010). The basic justification for the use of such cues is that
democratic accountability is enhanced in the presence of simple and accurate data on the
workings and performance of government. The extent to which the public responds to such
information—specifically with respect to the American public school system—is the central
concern that motivates this review of the existing literature.
School Satisfaction and Confidence in Education Institutions
Do measures of school performance alter perceptions of school performance? Much of the
evidence marshaled on behalf of this question comes from New York City. During the
Bloomberg Mayoral Administration, the New York City Department of Education (NYC
DOE) began conducting an annual survey of parents of public school students which included
questions on overall school satisfaction. Concurrently, the NYC DOE also launched its
system of publicly available “school report cards,” which reported a range of demographic
and educational attributes but which are typically remembered for their schoolwide grades
of A through F based on student achievement on state standardized assessments. In this
case, parental satisfaction presumably reflected, in part, a response to school performance
information.
A pair of correlational analyses offer the initial tentative evidence for a relationship
between NYC public school performance data and parental satisfaction. Both studies
find that average student performance on school report cards is associated with parental
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satisfaction, with a standardized effect size of between 0.15 and 0.30 (Charbonneau and Van
Ryzin 2012; Favero and Meier 2013). Interestingly, student performance measures for the
current academic year (which had not yet been released at the time of the parent survey)
were more predictive of parental satisfaction than the previous year’s data, indicating that
it may not be the published information itself that drives this relationship; rather, parents
may be responding to more informal sources of information on school quality (Charbonneau
and Van Ryzin 2012).
A third study using the NYC parent survey data takes a longitudinal approach,
revealing that parental satisfaction is related to changes in school performance levels
(Jacobsen, Saultz, and Snyder 2013). Specifically, after holding a range of school
characteristics constant, a one letter drop in school grade (e.g., from A to B) is associated
with a three percentage point decline in the probability of expressing satisfaction with the
school attended by one’s child. Such grade reductions occurred en masse from 2009 to 2010
when the state of New York adopted more rigorous tests. The school report card grades,
which were largely a function of proficiency rates on the state tests at the time, registered
the change by shifting many schools’ grades downward. This situation, in which school
performance likely remained fairly constant while indicators of school performance declined,
provides a unique opportunity to gauge the effect of performance measures rather than the
underlying performance itself.
The three NYC-based articles are convincing insofar as they document that there is
indeed a correlational link between school performance information and parental satisfaction
in the nation’s largest school district. However, they can only hint at the possibility that
the provision of such information actually causes changes in reported satisfaction. There
are also issues of generalizability: it is not clear from these studies if non-parents respond
in similar ways or if such effects also occur in settings that differ substantially from a dense
urban center. Chingos, Henderson, and West (2012) expand these findings on both fronts.
The school report card system in Florida assigns letter grades based on a continuous metric
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in which schools with trivially different scores can receive distinct grades, lending itself to
a regression discontinuity design. Because schools that differ by a matter of a few points
on either side of a grade threshold are, on average, indistinguishable in terms of quality,
any differences in school satisfaction are arguably a result of the letter grades themselves.
A positive relationship between school performance information and reported satisfaction
persists under this more robust methodological approach: a one letter grade increase on the
official school report card from C to B is associated with about half a letter grade increase
in respondents’ own assessments of their local schools. Furthermore, using a nationally
representative Internet-based survey, the researchers utilize respondents’ locations to identify
their nearest public schools (respondents could then select the most relevant school from a
short list). They then use publicly available student achievement data to compare school
performance with respondents’ school satisfaction in order to replicate the correlational
finding from the NYC studies in other geographic contexts and for non-parents as well
as parents.
A persistent difficulty with the study of the effects of school performance data on
satisfaction is the general inability to randomly assign such information from the outset.
Publicly available school performance data is, by definition, available to all. Importantly,
the kinds of individuals that acquire this information and the kinds of schools that proudly
publicize it undoubtedly differ from their peers on the other end of the spectrum. While some
of the non-experimental studies attempt to minimize these concerns by taking advantage of
propitious timing or by exploiting threshold effects along continuous measures of school
performance, other researchers take a different approach that addresses the issue more
directly.
Employing online survey experiments, three groups of researchers test the effect of
providing education performance data on confidence in the public schools. Henderson,
Howell, and Peterson (2014) demonstrate that the provision of local school district rankings
(compared to other districts in the same state or compared to all districts nationwide) causes
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respondents to evaluate their local schools less generously: the proportion of respondents
who give their local schools a grade of A or B drops by about ten percentage points. In
Tennessee, viewing data on statewide student proficiency rates (which are lower than most
respondents estimate) diminishes individuals’ assessments of the Tennessee public schools,
the Tennessee Department of Education, and, to a lesser extent, local public school boards—
which is consistent with the provision of state rather than local data (Clinton and Grissom
2015). At the national level, Howell, Peterson, and West (2009) observe a small negative
effect on confidence in the nation’s schools when they provide the ranking of the math skills
of U.S. 15-year-olds on an international assessment: the proportion of respondents who give
the nation’s public schools a grade of A or B drops by about five percentage points. However,
they find no effect of providing current high school graduation rates.
The relationship between school performance data and perceptions of school quality
also appears to vary by information format. Jacobsen, Snyder, and Saultz (2014) randomly
assign the same school performance data in four different versions (a performance index
rating, a letter grade, a ranking, and a percentage of students meeting a designated level
of proficiency—calibrated using existing state report cards that employ multiple metrics) to
four separate experimental groups. Survey-takers are particularly responsive to letter grades,
viewing A rated schools as dramatically better performing than D and F rated schools. The
difference in perceived quality of the same schools using other metrics is more muted.
To summarize, there appears to be a causal relationship between the provision of
student achievement data and confidence in one’s school system. This link occurs at all
levels of government: school district, state, and national. The largest effects are associated
with the provision of letter grades, but proficiency rates and rankings appear to induce
changes as well. Most of the examples in the academic literature on this issue point towards
a negative effect, but the Chingos, Henderson, and West (2012) regression discontinuity




While education leaders and scholars of public administration are interested in the effects of
school data on perceptions of the existing system, those engaged in contemporary education
reform debates are keen to know how the recent explosion of education data might be used
to alter positions and opinions on the contested issues of the day. The literature regarding
information effects on education policy preferences partitions into two categories: research on
the effects of generally apolitical descriptive data and research on the effects of intentionally
politicized (or clearly politicize-able) information. With respect to apolitical data, the
findings suggest a link between new information and policy preferences, but the relationship
is conditional on the direct relevance of the data to the policy in question. For example,
when given data on average per pupil expenditures and average teacher salaries (which tend
to be somewhat higher than most people estimate), the proportion of survey respondents
who support increased education spending in general drops by about eight percentage points
and the proportion of survey respondents who support increased teacher salaries drops by
about 16 percentage points (Howell, Peterson, and West 2009; Schueler and West 2016). In
this case, the relevance of the information to the policy in question is quite clear.
The effect of school performance data, such as standardized test scores, on education
policy preferences is less straightforward. In a nationwide survey, Henderson, Howell, and
Peterson (2014) use each respondent’s location in combination with publicly available student
achievement data to generate an estimated ranking of his or her local school district compared
to other districts in that state or compared to all districts nationwide. Because individuals
often think quite highly of their local schools, information on their districts’ estimated
rankings tends to force them to update their beliefs downwards. This new awareness also
appears to increase support for school choice policies such as vouchers, charter schools,
and parent trigger laws by four to thirteen percentage points. The effect of providing
education performance data on support for teachers is conditional on performance levels.
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Respondents in relatively low performing school districts tend to become less supportive of
teachers unions, but the opposite is true in relatively high performing districts. The link
between student achievement data and support for increased teacher salaries is muddled:
the effect varies from sharply negative to modestly positive based on current performance
levels and whether or not the question includes information on current average salaries.
At the state level, the provision of student proficiency rates in Tennessee (which are also
considerably lower than most respondents estimate) appears to have no effect on support
for vouchers, charter schools, public pre-kindergarten programs, test-based performance pay
for teachers, differential teacher pay for working in high-needs schools, or the No Child Left
Behind Act (Clinton and Grissom 2015). While these divergent findings may be the result
of the differential effects of rankings versus proficiency rates, it may also be possible that
underwhelming state level performance data induce less dramatic changes to previously held
political attitudes than discouraging district level data. In other words, learning that one’s
state as a whole suffers from lackluster educational performance may be consistent with the
widespread notion that one’s local schools are effective while the public school system in
general continues to struggle (Loveless 1997).
While descriptive information on school performance and expenditures can undoubt-
edly become the grist of partisan debate, such data require some level of interpretation
before a political narrative can take shape. Other cues, such as the political alignment of the
information source or the inclusion of information tailor-made to fit existing ideological per-
spectives, have a more direct connection to political attitudes. For example, Howell (2008)
conducts a simple survey experiment in which he randomizes both the information source
(“a [conservative/liberal] research organization in Washington, D.C.”) and the content (“stu-
dents in private schools [do/do not] score higher on tests than comparable students in public
schools”). Although he does not ask questions about attitudes towards public and private
schooling, the author explores the extent to which the politicization of research affects be-
liefs about the relative achievement between school sectors. In short, respondents are more
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likely to adopt the positions of politically aligned sources, and they are generally resistant to
update their beliefs when the new information contrasts their ideological priors and comes
from a politically unaligned source (e.g., when self-identified liberals read that private school
students outperform their public school peers from a conservative research organization).
Similarly, when respondents are provided information that evokes strongly held ideological
positions—such as when conservatives are told that charter schools typically hire nonunion
teachers—their stated policy preferences shift accordingly (Reckhow, Grossman, and Evans
2015). In this case, upon learning about charter hiring practices, conservatives are consid-
erably more likely to support the expansion of charter schools while liberals’ preferences
remain unchanged.
In short, there also appears to be a causal relationship between the provision of student
achievement data and education policy preferences, but this link only holds under some
conditions. District level rankings appear to cause individuals to become more amenable
to contemporary school choice reforms and, in some cases, more critical of teachers. The
same does not appear to be true for state level proficiency ratings, although the study that
explored this dynamic is limited to Tennessee. It is possible that this relationship is mediated
by individuals’ political identities insofar as people are more likely to update their views if
the new information is consistent with their political predispositions.
Differentiating Between Learning and Priming
Perhaps the most pervasive threat to the credibility of the existing literature on information
effects is the ambiguity over what outcomes are the result of learning new information and
what outcomes are merely the momentary effects of priming (Jenkins 2002; Lenz 2009).
Priming refers to the process through which individuals become temporarily attuned to
different considerations when answering questions, making decisions, or performing actions.
Psychologists generally define priming as any “procedure that increases the accessibility
of some category or construct in memory” at the expense of other potentially relevant
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considerations (Sherman, Mackie, and Driscoll 1990, 405). Priming effects fade quickly
as ideas descend to less accessible strata of memory over time. Because many studies of
information effects are embedded in survey experiments in which outcomes are measured
immediately after the provision of new information, it can be exceedingly difficult to
distinguish between information effects (which arguably ought to result in more lasting
changes) and priming effects (wherein even the mere mention of an issue may temporarily
invoke a range of considerations that alter survey responses).
Two of the studies cited here take this concern seriously and attempt to demonstrate
that at least some of the effect of providing new information is not due to priming alone.
Clinton and Grissom (2015) include an experiment in which one group is provided new
information on the racial achievement gap in Tennessee while the other group is merely
asked a question earlier in the survey on the same topic, thereby priming them on the issue
of racial equity without actually providing any new information. Respondents who receive
data on the achievement gap report lower confidence in Tennessee education institutions
than the respondents who are primed but not explicitly informed of the gap, suggesting an
information effect above and beyond the effect of priming.
Schueler and West (2016) try to differentiate between learning and priming by
exploring the extent to which the information effects they find vary by respondents’
pre-existing knowledge about the topic at hand. Schueler and West are investigating
whether providing information on per pupil expenditures and average teacher salaries affects
respondents’ preferences on government spending on education in general and teacher salaries
in particular. Because they also ask participants to estimate current spending levels before
providing the official amounts, they are able to see if the information effects are larger for
those that have more to learn. Their findings conform to this expectation, but they note that
there is also an effect for respondents who estimate current spending levels quite accurately.
This suggests that priming and information effects may be occurring simultaneously. The
inability to differentiate between the two therefore results in an inflated effect size that, even
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in the presence of random assignment, cannot be solely attributed to learning as a result of
new information.
Perhaps one of the simplest ways to distinguish between information effects and priming
effects is to measure outcomes at least one day after the provision of information. Whereas
priming effects are typically short-lived (unless an individual is subjected to repeated primes),
information effects ought to have at least a slightly longer half-life. What remains of an
information effect 24 hours later would almost certainly be distinct from the previous day’s
prime. Unfortunately, this conceptually simple albeit logistically challenging approach is
completely absent from the study of information effects on attitudes towards the public
schools.
Information Effect Longevity
The process of forgetting new information may also begin quite rapidly. Information effects
undoubtedly fade over time as well, yet there is little research on this dynamic. Survey
experiments, the most common methodological approach to the study of information effects
and related concepts, rarely include follow-up surveys, inhibiting our understanding of the
stability, duration, and decay rate of attitudinal changes that occur as a result of learning new
information. If the effects uncovered by survey experiments are fleeting, then the obvious
question arises as to their substantive importance. Gaines, Kuklinski, and Quirk (2007,
6), whose overview of the shortcomings of survey experiments for political research has been
influential, lay out the challenge succinctly: “The implications of survey-experimental results
for politics depend crucially on how long the effects last, with relevant periods measured in
weeks, or months, not minutes.” Coppock (2016) responds to Gaines, Kuklinski, and Quirk’s
critique by documenting persistent and long-lasting, though relatively small, information
effects in a number of non-education fields. According to Coppock, survey experimental
information effects tend to persist after ten days at about half their original size.
Baden and Lecheler (2012) suggest that treatments that present new information—as
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opposed to treatments that merely make existing information more accessible or applicable
to a particular context—are more likely to persist over time because of their comparative
resilience to subsequent stimuli that activate other considerations. It is not immediately clear
whether student achievement data ought to be considered new information or if the provision
of such data merely makes existing information more accessible. It seems plausible that many
Americans have a general sense of student performance even if few individuals keep updated
achievement figures close at hand. If the provision of student achievement data merely
reactivates pre-existing knowledge, then we might expect the effects to fade quickly. If, on the
other hand, the provision of student achievement data offers genuinely new information, then
the effects may persist beyond the initial experiment. There is some evidence that receiving
school performance data shapes attitudes for a nontrivial period of time. In Hastings and
Weinstein’s (2008) field experiment on the effects of student achievement information in a
structured school choice environment, families’ school enrollment decisions were influenced
by the information they received, and the decisions occurred two months after the experiment
began. Yet we lack a direct measurement of how long the effects of new education-related
information last on individuals’ cognition and how the magnitude of those effects diminishes
over time.
Methodology
How do individuals update their beliefs and attitudes on issues of education upon receiving
information about schools? The most common approach to this question is the use of a single-
session survey experiment in which a randomly selected treatment group receives public
education performance or administrative data (such as student proficiency rates, graduation
rates, per pupil expenditures, average teacher salaries, etc.) while a randomly selected control
group does not. After the provision of information, both experimental groups answer a range
of questions about their attitudes towards issues of education, such as their confidence in their
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local schools or their support for contemporary education reforms like charter schools and
vouchers. Multiple studies purport to show effects of these kinds of data on survey-takers’
responses. The literature contains strong claims of the influence of education performance
data on respondents’ attitudes towards public schooling, but the importance of these findings
is contingent on the durability of the attitudinal changes. It is my goal to ascertain whether
these effects persist under a more rigorous research design and, if so, whether they are large
enough to substantively alter our political dialogue on public education.
I administer a survey experiment in which treated individuals receive their state’s
eighth grade math proficiency rates on the 2015 NAEP, while the control group takes
the same survey without the provision of student proficiency rates. I chose these
data specifically because they offer a particularly unflattering assessment of education
performance. According to this benchmark, fewer than 50 percent of eighth graders were
considered proficient in math in every state except Massachusetts, which had a 51 percent
proficiency rate. This consistency arguably allows me to produce a relatively uniform
impression of student achievement across state lines. Afterwards, I ask subjects about their
confidence in the their state school systems and governors as well as their attitudes towards
a set of contemporary education policy issues. I also conduct a follow-up survey the next
day with the same questions in order to minimize the extent to which priming alters my
estimates of the average treatment effects. Lastly, I conduct a second follow-up survey after
ten days have elapsed, allowing me to identify whether or not the average treatment effects
persist and, if so, how the magnitudes of those effects change over time.
Research Questions
1. What are the average effects of providing individuals with their states’ 2015 NAEP
eighth grade math proficiency rates on their attitudes towards issues of education
policy?
2. Do these effects persist after one day has elapsed? How large are they?
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3. Do these effects persist after ten days have elapsed? How large are they?
4. Do these effects differ for various demographic groups?
Data Sources
To recruit subjects for the initial survey, I used Amazon’s Mechanical Turk1 service. The
subject pool for the initial survey consisted of 1,003 U.S. residents over the age of 18. Of
these original subjects, 823 also completed the one day follow-up survey. A total of 674
individuals completed the initial survey and both follow-up surveys.
I used the Qualtrics survey platform to administer the experiment and follow-up sur-
veys. In the initial survey, I asked respondents for their primary U.S. state of residence.
I then provided a series of statewide data points to all respondents about their respective
states: the population size, the unemployment rate, the median household income, and the
general election turnout in 2016. In each instance, respondents had to indicate that they
read the information by answering a simple question about it. They were unable to con-
tinue with the survey until they answered correctly. I employed this method to ensure that
respondents received the information and did not merely click through this portion of the
survey. All subjects successfully completed this section. Using Qualtrics’ “Randomizer” fea-
ture, a randomly assigned treatment group received one additional question in which they
were provided their states’ 2015 NAEP eighth grade math proficiency rates:
% of eighth graders in [state] public schools were considered proficient in math in 2015.
(National Assessment of Educational Progress, U.S. Department of Education)
What percentage of eighth graders were considered proficient in math in [state] public schools
in 2015?
1 Mechanical Turk is an online market in which users complete short tasks (such as online surveys) for a
small fee. See Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz (2012) and Follmer, Sperlin, and Suen (2017) on the use of
Mechanical Turk for political and educational research.
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[four answer choices—only one of which is correct]
Respondents were then asked a series of questions about education issues in their state:
1. How confident are you in the [state] public elementary and secondary school system?
2. Do you support or oppose increasing the amount of money that [state] spends on public
elementary and secondary schools?
3. Do you support or oppose increasing public school teacher salaries in [state]?
4. Do you support or oppose evaluating teachers in [state] based on student achievement?
5. Do you support or oppose increasing the number of charter schools in [state]?
6. Do you support or oppose the use of publicly-funded tuition vouchers for low-income
families to send their children to private schools in [state]?
7. Do you support or oppose the adoption of the Common Core State Standards in [state]?
8. How confident are you in [governor name], the governor of [state]?
I chose these questions in order to situate my study in the context of prior research on
the effects of student achievement data on school confidence and education policy preferences.
Question 1 assesses confidence in one’s state school system. Questions 2–7 represent
contemporary education reform debates. Some prior research suggests that individuals are
more likely to support reform efforts when they become aware of current performance levels
(Henderson, Howell, and Peterson 2014), while other research finds no connection between
the provision of student achievement data and attitudes towards contemporary political
debates on education issues (Clinton and Grissom 2015). Question 8 seeks to understand
whether respondents are also willing to hold non-education elected officials accountable for
student achievement.
Respondents’ answers were recorded on four-point Likert scales (“Not at all confident”
to “Very confident” or “Strongly oppose” to “Strongly support”). Lastly, respondents
answered a set of demographic questions about their age, parental status, sex, race/ethnicity,
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educational attainment, political party identification, and political ideology. In the follow-up
surveys, respondents re-answered the same questions about education in their state. A full
list of all questions in all three surveys is provided in the appendix.
I also use data from the American National Election Studies 2016 Time Series Survey
(ANES) to explore how the demographic composition of my subject pool compares to the
country as a whole. The ANES is a nationally representative survey of Americans’ political
attitudes conducted before and after every U.S. presidential election.
Analytic Approach
For each of the eight outcomes, I calculate two versions of the average treatment effect:
1. A bivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of the outcome on an indicator of
treatment status
2. A multivariate OLS regression of the outcome on an indicator of treatment status, a
vector of demographic covariates, and fixed effects for state of residence
I measure my outcomes using a four-point Likert scale. While traditional OLS
regression can accommodate Likert scales as continuous variables, it is not clear whether the
intervals of the scale are indeed equal in size. Therefore, I also conduct the same analyses
using ordered logistic regression. The results are substantively equivalent; therefore, only
the OLS results are presented here.
I test five hypotheses drawn from the existing literature on the effects of student
achievement data on public opinion:
1. The provision of statewide education performance data will lower reported confidence
in state education systems.
2. The provision of statewide education performance data will reduce support for increased
state spending on state school systems in general and teacher salaries in particular.
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3. The provision of statewide education performance data will increase support for
contemporary education reform policies such as charter schools, private school tuition
vouchers, evaluating teachers based on student achievement, and the adoption of the
Common Core State Standards.
4. The provision of statewide education performance data will also lower reported
confidence in non-education state officials, such as the governor.
5. The magnitude of the effects proposed in Hypotheses 1–4 will be reduced in each
successive measurement of outcomes.
To assess the statistical significance of these directional hypotheses, I follow the
expectations of my pre-analysis plan (available on the Open Science Framework) and employ
one-tailed tests with an alpha level of 0.05. For the average treatment effects recovered with
OLS regression, I use randomization inference to calculate p-values for one-tailed tests of the
sharp null hypothesis that the treatment effect is zero for all subjects. To do this, I calculate
the average treatment effect under the sharp null hypothesis for 10,000 possible randomized
treatment assignments. The p-value is the proportion of average treatment effect estimates
that are at least as large (or small) as the one produced by the actual experiment.
To test for balance between treatment and control groups, I regress treatment status
on the demographic covariates and calculate an F -statistic. I determine the statistical
significance of that F -statistic by using randomization inference, calculating analogous F -
statistics under the null hypothesis that no covariates have any effect on the assigned
treatment for 10,000 possible randomized treatment assignments. The p-value is the
proportion of test statistics that are at least as large as the one produced by the actual
experiment.
There is one instance of missing data in the initial survey.2 One respondent chose not
2 This level of completeness is typical of respondents recruited via Mechanical Turk. Such respondents are
dependent upon approval by the survey administrator in order to be paid for their efforts. I compensated
all individuals who took any portion of any survey as long as they subsequently documented their work on
Mechanical Turk. Other than the statewide data questions (in which respondents were required to answer
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to answer demographic questions. For simplicity, I drop this subject from the analyses of
the initial survey. This individual did not complete either follow-up survey.
To test for differential attrition by experimental condition and by demographic
characteristics, I conduct two analyses:
1. A bivariate OLS regression of missingness on an indicator of treatment status
2. A multivariate OLS regression of missingness on an indicator of treatment status and
a vector of demographic covariates
I perform these analyses two times: after the one day follow-up survey and again after the ten
day follow-up survey. In my analysis, the test for differential attrition in the ten day follow-up
survey approaches the threshold of statistical significance. Therefore, I also conduct a more
thorough investigation, wherein I regress missingness on an indicator of treatment status,
a vector of demographic covariates, and a set of interactions between treatment status and
each covariate.
I explore treatment effect heterogeneity by parental status, political party identifi-
cation, and political ideology. I had no prior hypotheses about the directionality of such
heterogeneous treatment effects. Therefore, this portion of the analysis is exploratory and
is presented as such. Given the number of covariates and outcomes, the potential for Type
I errors is high.
Lastly, I conduct a non-experimental analysis of opinion stability both at the aggregate
and the individual level. At the aggregate level, I calculate the average response for each
political attitude in each survey administration and then graph these preferences over time.
At the individual level, I calculate the Pearson correlation coefficients of each political
attitude in the initial survey and the same attitude in subsequent survey administrations.
a simple question correctly in order to indicate that they read the information), respondents were free to
leave any question blank.
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Findings
Representativeness, Balance, and Attrition
Table 1.1 displays the frequency of various demographic characteristics by experimental
condition. It also displays the frequency of the same characteristics in the 2016 American
National Election Study, a nationally representative survey of political attitudes. The
experimental subject pool is somewhat younger, better educated, and more likely to
identify as Democrats and liberals than the U.S. as a whole. On other dimensions—
sex, race/ethnicity, and parental status—the subject pool roughly approximates the
characteristics of the population.
The random assignment of treatment effectively establishes treatment and control
groups with similar demographic compositions. This is true among the subjects who took
the initial survey (F = 1.05, p = 0.38), among those who completed both the initial survey
and the one day follow-up survey (F = 0.87, p = 0.78), and among those who completed all
three surveys (F = 0.88, p = 0.75). Although the omnibus F -tests indicate overall balance
between experimental conditions across all covariates taken as a whole, it is worth noting that
there is a slightly higher proportion of Democrats in the treatment group. This particular
difference is statistically significant among subjects who completed the initial survey, and it
approaches significance in the subsets of the subject pool that completed subsequent surveys.
Because I hypothesize that the provision of state level student achievement data will generally
shift subjects towards more politically conservative positions, this minor imbalance could
attenuate the magnitude of the treatment effects.
Among the subjects who completed both the initial survey and the one day follow-
up survey, there is no relationship between treatment status and attrition after the initial
survey (F = 0.65, p = 0.41). The same is true among those who completed all three surveys
(F = 0.03, p = 0.85). I also explored whether or not certain demographic groups were more
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Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment
% (n=502) (n=501) (n=407) (n=416) (n=336) (n=338)
Parent of School-Age Child 38.2 40.5 37.1 39.7 35.1 39.1 33.7
Female 54.4 49.5 52.3 48.6 51.8 48.8 52.9
White 80.0 81.8 79.1 81.5 79.4 80.8 71.7
Black 7.6 7.6 7.9 7.7 7.5 8.0 9.4
Hispanic 4.6 3.8 4.9 3.6 4.8 3.8 10.6
Other Race 7.8 6.8 8.1 7.2 8.4 7.4 8.3
Less Than High School 1.2 0.6 1.0 0.5 0.9 0.6 18.5
High School 11.2 10.8 11.3 10.3 11.0 11.6 19.3
Some College 24.6 27.3 23.4 28.1 24.5 27.8 21.2
Associate’s Degree 14.8 15.4 13.8 14.7 12.2 13.9 14.2
Bachelor’s or Higher 48.3 45.9 50.5 46.4 51.3 45.9 26.8
Republican 27.7 23.6 25.4 23.6 26.6 23.4 30.4
Democrat 40.5 47.1 41.1 46.6 40.0 46.4 35.8
Independent 31.7 29.3 33.5 29.8 33.4 30.2 33.8
Conservative 30.5 26.3 30.5 27.9 32.1 26.0 41.7
Liberal 47.4 49.3 47.4 48.3 45.5 48.5 31.2
Moderate 22.1 24.4 22.1 23.8 22.3 25.4 27.1
Age (Years) 37.3 36.2 37.1 36.5 37.9 37.2 49.6




18.9 17.0 33.1 32.5
F 2 0.65 0.03
(p=0.41) (p=0.85)
F 3 1.19 1.27
(p=0.14) (p=0.08)
Notes: F 1 calculated by regressing assignment to treatment on a vector of covariates; F 2 calculated
by regressing an indicator of missingness on assignment to treatment; F 3 calculated by regressing
an indicator of missingness on assignment to treatment and a vector of covariates; ANES values
calculated among respondents who provided answers similar to options in the survey experiment; p-
values calculated using randomization inference.
likely to attrit than others. Collectively, attrition in the one day follow-up survey is not a
function of all of the demographic characteristics taken as a whole (F = 1.19, p = 0.14).
After ten days, however, my test for differential attrition approaches statistical significance
(F = 1.27, p = 0.08).
I explore the potential for unequal levels of attrition by demographic profile and
treatment status in greater detail in Table 1.2. All else equal, parents and Republicans
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Table 1.2: Differential Attrition in the Third Survey (n = 1003)
Coef (SE) Coef (SE)
Intercept 0.40 (0.08)
Information (Treatment) 0.12 (0.12)
Age 0.00 (0.00) Info × Age 0.00 (0.00)
Parent 0.08 (0.04) Info × Parent -0.05 (0.06)
Female 0.06 (0.04) Info × Female -0.04 (0.06)
Black -0.03 (0.08) Info × Black -0.03 (0.12)
Hispanic -0.05 (0.10) Info × Hispanic 0.03 (0.15)
Other Race -0.06 (0.08) Info × Other Race -0.02 (0.12)
Less Than High School 0.17 (0.20) Info × Less Than High School -0.18 (0.34)
High School 0.06 (0.07) Info × High School -0.11 (0.10)
Some College 0.05 (0.05) Info × Some College -0.06 (0.07)
Associate’s Degree 0.14 (0.06) Info × Associate’s Degree -0.09 (0.09)
Republican 0.19 (0.08) Info × Republican -0.20 (0.12)
Independent 0.01 (0.06) Info × Independent -0.02 (0.08)
Conservative -0.21 (0.08) Info × Conservative 0.22 (0.11)
Moderate -0.08 (0.06) Info × Moderate 0.04 (0.09)
F 1.32
R2 0.04
Notes: Values are from a single OLS regression in which the dependent variable is an indicator of
missingness in the third survey; Parent refers to a parent of a school-aged child; race/ethnicity compared
to White; educational attainment compared to Bachelor’s Degree or Higher; party identification
compared to Democrat; political ideology compared to Liberal.
were more likely to attrit than non-parents and Democrats—although they did so at similar
rates in both the treatment and control groups. More problematic is the unequal rate of
attrition for self-identified conservatives. Conservatives were more likely to drop out of the
experiment if they were in the treatment group. This pattern becomes apparent in the
analysis of treatment effect decay from the initial survey to the ten day follow-up survey.
When I restrict the subject pool to those individuals who completed all three surveys, the
direction of the treatment effect shifts in a more liberal direction across all three survey
administrations (more detail in Table 1.5).
Information Effects
Table 1.3 displays the average treatment effects of the provision of student performance data
on public opinion in the initial survey (n = 1003). There appears to be a small negative
effect of student achievement data on confidence in one’s state school system: on average,
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Table 1.3: Information Effects in the Initial Survey (n = 1003)
Control Treatment Unadjusted Adjusted
Outcome Mean SD Mean SD ÂTE (SE) ÂTE (SE)
Confidence in Schools 2.32 0.78 2.23 0.80 -0.09 (0.05) -0.10 (0.05)
Increased Spending 3.27 0.80 3.31 0.79 0.05 (0.05) -0.01 (0.05)
Teacher Salaries 3.25 0.83 3.32 0.78 0.07 (0.05) 0.04 (0.05)
Teacher Evaluation 2.75 0.91 2.75 0.91 -0.01 (0.06) -0.02 (0.06)
Charter Schools 2.58 0.92 2.56 0.90 -0.02 (0.06) -0.01 (0.05)
Tuition Vouchers 2.54 1.03 2.55 1.05 0.01 (0.07) 0.01 (0.07)
Common Core 2.12 0.96 2.15 1.01 0.03 (0.06) -0.01 (0.06)
Confidence in Governor 2.15 0.96 2.20 0.96 0.05 (0.06) 0.07 (0.06)
Notes: Values are average responses on four-point scales (“Not at all confident” to “Very confident”
or “Strongly oppose” to “Strongly support”); covariates include parental status, sex, race/ethnicity,
educational attainment, political party identification, political ideology, age, and state of residence;
standard errors calculated using randomization inference.
confidence declines by about a tenth of a point on a four-point scale (a standardized effect
size of -0.12 or -0.13, depending on the model). This pattern does not extend to attitudes
on other education policies. The provision of student achievement data does not have an
effect on attitudes towards state spending on education, teacher salaries, evaluating teachers
based on student performance, charter schools, vouchers, the Common Core State Standards,
or confidence in one’s governor. In the initial survey, I find modest evidence in favor of
Hypothesis 1 (lower confidence in the state school system) and no evidence in favor of
Hypotheses 2–4 (less support for spending and greater support for reform policies).
Table 1.4 displays the average treatment effects in both the initial survey and the one
day follow-up survey among those subjects who completed both (n = 823). The magnitude,
direction, and significance of the effect of student achievement data on confidence in one’s
state school system in the initial survey remain consistent among this subset of the subject
pool. One day after the provision of treatment, the size of the effect diminishes slightly
(from -0.09 to either -0.05 or -0.07, depending on the model) and is no longer statistically
significant. This provides some tentative evidence in favor of Hypothesis 5, which states that
the magnitude of the effects would be reduced over time. This is consistent with the notion
that respondents may already be at least somewhat familiar with current math achievement
levels. The provision of student proficiency rates may make this knowledge more accessible,
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Confidence in Schools -0.09 -0.09 -0.05 -0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Increased Spending 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.04
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Teacher Salaries 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.08
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Teacher Evaluation 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Charter Schools 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Tuition Vouchers 0.03 0.04 -0.02 -0.02
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Common Core 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.01
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Confidence in Governor 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Covariates Yes Yes
Notes: Values are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; covariates include
parental status, sex, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, political party identification, political
ideology, age, and state of residence; standard errors calculated using randomization inference.
but only temporarily.
On a longer timeline, there is no link between student achievement data and any of the
political attitudes measured in this experiment. Table 1.5 displays the average treatment
effects for each outcome in each survey administration among those subjects who completed
all three surveys (n = 674). In every case, the average treatment effect is statistically
indistinguishable from zero. Note that the average treatment effect on confidence in schools
is now zero in the initial survey as well. This is likely due to differential attrition by political
ideology. Self-identified conservatives in the treatment group were less likely to complete the
third survey than their ideological peers in the control group. As a result, when I restrict
the subject pool to those respondents who completed all three surveys, the estimate of the
average treatment effect shifts slightly in the liberal direction for each survey administration.
The estimated effect is now zero in the initial survey and modestly positive in the ten day
follow-up survey. This is the same trajectory we would expect if, in the absence of differential
attrition, the effect of providing state level student achievement on confidence in the subject’s
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Confidence in Schools 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.04
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Increased Spending 0.03 -0.03 0.08 0.02 0.10 0.04
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Teacher Salaries 0.07 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.12 0.05
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Teacher Evaluation 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.03
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Charter Schools -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.05 -0.07 -0.04
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Tuition Vouchers -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Common Core 0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Confidence in Governor 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Values are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; covariates include
parental status, sex, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, political party identification, political
ideology, age, and state of residence; standard errors calculated using randomization inference.
state school system is initially negative and then attenuates towards zero over time. Under
this assumption, the results from all three surveys are therefore consistent with Hypothesis
1 and Hypothesis 5. I continue to find no evidence in favor of Hypotheses 2–4.
To summarize, the provision of statewide student achievement data only appears to
have an effect on one outcome—confidence in the state school system—but the size of this
effect is relatively small: only about one-tenth of a standard deviation. Moreover, this effect
essentially disappears after one day has elapsed. There is no trace of it after ten days. I
find no evidence of any effects of statewide student achievement data on education policy
preferences such as increasing overall spending levels, increasing teacher salaries, evaluating
teachers based on student test scores, increasing the number of charter schools, offering
private school tuition vouchers to low-income students, or adopting the Common Core State




Arguably, it may be the case that the appearance of no average effect is the consequence
of heterogenous treatment effects that balance out. There is little evidence in favor of this
conjecture, and the reader should approach the forthcoming analysis of treatment effect
heterogeneity with caution. Table 1.6 displays a series of 24 OLS regression models in which
each of the eight outcomes is regressed on three combinations of variables: 1) treatment

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Information -0.08 0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.06 0.05
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Parent 0.13 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.25 0.09 -0.24 0.13
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
Info × Parent -0.04 0.05 0.14 -0.12 -0.02 0.07 -0.06 0.00
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12)
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Information -0.12 -0.05 -0.01 -0.06 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.06
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
Republican -0.05 -0.56 -0.53 0.15 0.69 0.10 -0.45 0.16
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10)
Info × Rep 0.05 0.14 0.20 0.09 -0.10 -0.18 -0.10 0.18
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15)
Independent -0.22 -0.43 -0.33 -0.10 0.31 -0.08 -0.26 0.03
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
Info × Ind 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.13 -0.06 0.06 -0.21 -0.11
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14)
(17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
Information -0.12 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.00
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Conservative -0.04 -0.64 -0.58 0.06 0.73 0.22 -0.47 0.21
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
Info × Con 0.01 0.19 0.24 0.24 -0.11 -0.31 0.06 0.21
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
Moderate -0.07 -0.30 -0.27 0.19 0.46 0.23 -0.00 0.20
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
Info × Mod 0.12 0.08 0.10 -0.12 -0.08 -0.03 -0.28 0.00
(0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15)
Notes: Values are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; Parent refers to a
parent of a school-aged child; Republican and Independent compared to Democrat; Conservative and
Moderate compared to Liberal.
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and parental status, 2) treatment and party identification, and 3) treatment and political
ideology. The sheer number of combinations makes the potential for Type I errors, or false
positives, quite high.
There are two instances in which there is evidence of treatment effect heterogeneity
by these demographic characteristics. The provision of student achievement data appears to
have a modest, positive effect on support for increased teacher salaries among conservatives
(+0.21). In contrast, it appears to have a trivial, negative effect among liberals (-0.03).
Alternatively, the provision of student achievement data appears to have a modest, negative
effect on support for vouchers among conservatives (-0.21), while it appears to have a small,
positive effect among liberals (+0.10). In both cases, the treatment effect heterogeneity
appears idiosyncratic rather than part of a larger pattern incorporating ideologically similar
education policies. While it may be the case that individuals’ parental status, party
identification, and political ideology shape their education policy preferences, these aspects
of one’s identity do not appear to influence the ways in which individuals incorporate new
information into their opinions in any systematic way.
Opinion Stability
In the absence of any large and lasting treatment effects, one might wonder whether public
opinion on these issues is either generally resistant to change or if attitudes are more or less
random. The elements of aggregate public opinion explored in this experiment are relatively
stable over time. After ten days, there is almost no change in the levels of support for
each policy and the degree of confidence expressed in respondents’ state school systems and
governors (see Figure 1.1). In most cases, the average responses in the initial survey and
the ten day follow-up survey differ by less than a tenth of a point on a four-point scale.
While political scientists have long recognized the temporal stability of aggregate public
opinion (see Page and Shapiro 1992), it is noteworthy to observe such little movement on a
set of relatively specific and esoteric policy positions. It appears that the subject pool as a
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Figure 1.1: Aggregate Opinion Stability (n = 674)
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whole has clear and distinct preferences on a range of education issues. While there is broad
support for increased spending on education in general and teacher salaries in particular,
there are roughly equal numbers of supporters and detractors on more contentious issues
such as tying teacher evaluations to student performance, charter schools, and private school
tuition vouchers (the surveys only provided options to support or oppose—there were no
neutral or undecided options available). In contrast, a majority of respondents had a lower
opinion of the Common Core State Standards. It is important to note that, while the subject
pool is demographically similar in many respects to the U.S. population, it is not a nationally
representative sample. The reader should not mistake these values for estimates of support
among all Americans. Because respondents are more likely to identify as Democrats and
liberals than the country as a whole, one might infer that these values overestimate support
for increased spending and underestimate support for various teacher evaluation and school
choice reform policies.
While aggregate public opinion on many issues tends to move slowly and somewhat
predictably, the same is not always true of individual public opinion. Individual survey-
takers have acquired a rather poor reputation for ideological coherence and consistency
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0.81 0.82 0.89 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.91 0.93
Ten Day
Follow-Up
0.75 0.76 0.84 0.77 0.80 0.85 0.87 0.89
Notes: Values are Pearson correlation coefficients of each political attitude in the initial survey and the
same attitude at a later date.
over time (Converse 1964; Kinder and Sears 1985). The conventional wisdom suggests that
political opinions held by individuals tend to vary widely from survey to survey. Table
1.7 displays the correlations of each political attitude measured in the initial survey and
the same attitude measured in each of the follow-up surveys. The correlations between
responses in the initial survey and the one day follow-up survey range from 0.81 to 0.93,
and the correlations between responses in the initial survey and the ten day follow-up survey
range from 0.75 to 0.89. Individuals were most consistent on the most politically-charged
questions (the Common Core and confidence in the governor) and were least consistent in
their reported confidence in the state school system. These results are similar to the opinion
stability observed by Brown (1970) in his analysis of general political attitudes over the
course of two to six weeks. Brown asked respondents to agree or disagree on a 10-point scale
with 48 statements on basic political values (e.g., “Just because a man is a human being
doesn’t make him smart enough to vote” and “Men are equal—maybe not financially or in
influence—but equal to one another as to being a person”) and typically found correlations
between 0.60 and 0.90 across survey administrations. It is notable that specific questions
about the details of education policy should generate a similar degree of consistency over
time. On the other hand, the ten day interval employed here prohibits the estimation of
long-term opinion stability. It may still be the case that the consistency observed over a
week and a half may begin to degrade after a few months or a few years transpire.
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Conclusions
There is some evidence that the provision of statewide student achievement data temporarily
reduces individuals’ confidence in their state school systems. This effect does not appear to
extend to other education policy preferences or to assessments of state officials who do
not focus exclusively on education. However, the effect does not persist after the initial
experiment. After one day, the effect is reduced in size and is no longer statistically
significant. After ten days, there is no evidence of an effect at all. A number of previous
studies measured outcomes more or less immediately after the provision of treatment.
Research designs that take this approach are liable to produce fleeting effects which may
not translate into the political environment. We should be cautious about generalizing the
findings of such studies.
This experiment also suggests that education policy preferences are relatively well
defined—even on specific issues such as evaluating teachers based on student performance,
charter schools, vouchers, and the Common Core State Standards. At least over the short-
term, this is true both at the aggregate level and for individuals. Taken as a whole, the
subject pool in this experiment appears to have formed clear and distinct political opinions
on issues of education, and these opinions are not easily influenced by data on student
performance.
These findings have both positive and negative implications for education policymaking.
On one hand, it is reassuring to see the consistency with which the subject pool expresses its
education policy preferences, suggesting a relatively high degree of coherence with respect to
these opinions. On the other hand, the stability of these attitudes in the face of education
performance data augurs poorly for a system of democratic accountability. If confidence
in the state school system and support for various education policies are unaffected by
contemporary measures of student achievement, then the incentives for democratically
elected officials to respond to such data may be weak or nonexistent. Without such
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constraints, debates over education policy can quickly become untethered to empirical reality.
The question of whether or not there are effects of student achievement data on
public opinion is far from settled. This study explores the effects of a snapshot of student
achievement on a single subject-grade combination at a single level of government. It would
be important to investigate the extent to which the provision of longitudinal achievement
data documenting progress (or the lack thereof) affects confidence in the school system,
elected officials, and education policy preferences. It is also unclear whether individuals
respond in systematic ways to different forms of education performance data (proficiency
rates, graduation rates, suspension rates, etc.), to data on different subjects and grades, or
to education performance data at different levels of government. Future research should also
consider the extent to which subjects’ prior beliefs differ on various aspects of education
performance and if these prior beliefs influence how subjects incorporate new information
into their opinions. Answers to these questions could help us develop a richer theory about
how individuals’ views on the public school system respond to the dramatic increase in
student achievement data available today.
Lastly, additional research is necessary to understand how larger shifts in the broader
information environment affect attitudes towards the public schools. Rather than testing the
effects of discrete pieces of information delivered once in a survey context, researchers may
be interested in exploiting some of the natural variation in the timing with which school
districts and states begin collecting and disseminating different kinds of data on student
achievement. For example, as school systems unevenly begin to shift their attention from
measures of student proficiency to measures of student growth, well-timed surveys could




Policy Responsiveness in the States
Many of the pioneers of public education in the United States sought to insulate schools
from the rough-and-tumble of partisan politics and the influence of powerful politicians.
This strategy attempted to shield educators from the perils—both real and perceived—
of the political machines, cronyism, and corruption of late 19th and early 20th century
American democracy (Davies 2007; Gamson 2003; Tyack and Cuban 1997). Today, mayors
and governors vary considerably in their degree of direct control over the public schools in
their jurisdictions. In most cases, school systems are governed by local and state boards
of education chosen in separate and often sparsely attended elections. School district
superintendents and chief state school officers are typically appointed by these boards or,
in some cases, elected directly. In a few cities and states, mayors and governors have
the authority to appoint top school administrators, but this arrangement is the exception
rather than the rule. The politics of education face different electoral pressures than those
policy domains more directly under the purview of the highest elected public official. This
study investigates whether education is subject to the same democratic forces, such as mass
public opinion, that influence public endeavors in other policy areas. Specifically, I consider
I would like to thank the staff at NORC at the University of Chicago for providing access to restricted-
use General Social Survey data. I would also like to thank Jeffrey Henig, Priscilla Wohlstetter, Justin
Phillips, Donald Green, Robert Shapiro, and Robert Erikson for their guidance and thoughtful feedback.
This research is supported by the National Academy of Education/Spencer Dissertation Fellowship, the
Teachers College Research Dissertation Fellowship, and the Teachers College Department of Education
Policy and Social Analysis. The code for this study can be found on the Open Science Framework at
https://osf.io/8d9fe/.
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the extent to which public K–12 education expenditures reflect public opinion on current
spending levels.
This analysis focuses on public opinion and education spending in the American states,
the units of government responsible for the majority of public school expenditures in the
U.S. (Berkman and Plutzer 2005). I explore how the citizens of each state vary in their
support for increased spending on public schools, and I compare this to actual statewide
per pupil expenditures. I also examine how various social and economic groups in each
state differ in their support for increased spending, thus enabling me to investigate whether
the spending preferences of historically privileged groups are more predictive of statewide
education expenditures than the preferences of their less advantaged peers. Lastly, I analyze
the relationship between the strength of state teachers unions—one of the most influential
political forces in education policy—and the extent to which state residents are more likely
to experience education spending levels that reflect their preferences.
In order to pursue these lines of inquiry about state level democratic responsiveness
and education policy, I rely on a relatively novel approach to the estimation of statewide
public opinion: multilevel regression and poststratification. The primary obstacle in the
pursuit of these research questions is the absence of public opinion survey data that is
representative at the state level. In order to generate accurate estimates of statewide support
for increased education spending, I model these preferences as a function of both demographic
and geographic predictors using national survey data. I then poststratify by weighting
the predicted probabilities of support for increased spending among each demographic-
geographic category by Census counts of each category in each state and the District of
Columbia. The end result is 51 estimated levels of statewide support for increased education
spending for each year from 1984 to 2013. With these data in hand, the fundamental




This study follows from the normative expectation that public policy, including education
policy, ought to have at least a passing relationship with public opinion. However, it is not
at all obvious why one ought to assume that this connection exists. The American model
of government is more than a few steps removed from an idealized classical democracy in
which every citizen votes directly on every major issue at hand. In a massive, complex,
and hierarchical system, what would be the means through which the preferences captured
by public opinion surveys get translated into policy? Luttbeg (1968) proposes five broad
mechanisms through which public opinion could plausibly affect the kinds of policies that
are actually enacted. First, the rational-activist model holds that voters choose candidates
whose policy positions are closest to their own. Second, the sharing model suggests that
politicians come from the same culture as voters and therefore share their preferences,
resulting in policies consistent with mass opinion even if there are no direct levers for
popular influence. Third, the political parties model states that, because the Democratic and
Republican parties diverge somewhat cleanly on ideological lines, voters can align themselves
with their ideologically preferred party and simply vote for its members who then pursue
ideologically consistent policies. Fourth, in the delegate model, elected officials are sufficiently
fearful of voters at reelection time and, as such, attempt to implement their constituencies’
preferences. Lastly, according to the interest groups model, when elected officials respond to
interest groups, they are also responding to the public’s wishes because such groups represent
broad sections of the public.
In the context of this particular study, I am agnostic as to the mechanism(s) through
which public opinion might affect public policy. Even simpler questions remain unanswered.
I seek to identify 1) whether or not statewide education spending levels actually reflect the
preferences of state residents, 2) whether the preferences of the white and the wealthy are
more predictive of spending levels than the preferences of their historically disadvantaged
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peers, and 3) whether these relationships vary based on the relative strength of teachers
unions in each state. The first two lines of inquiry are, in a loose sense, indicators of
democratic functioning. In a democratic country, we generally expect that states with
stronger public support for education spending will tend to spend more on schools and
that states with weaker support for education spending will tend to spend somewhat
less. Ideally, we also generally expect that education spending levels should not be
exclusively responsive to the interests of a single group. Deviations from these expectations
would indicate a potential problem in democratic functioning and would invite further
investigation. The third line of inquiry offers an initial foray into that work. If there is
evidence of unresponsiveness or unequal responsiveness, then it would be useful to know the
characteristics of the states where such issues are most severe. Specifically, I seek to know
if the strength of a state’s teachers union is associated with either heightened or attenuated
responsiveness.
In the following literature review, I provide some background on these three primary
themes: evidence of policy responsiveness in general, unequal responsiveness, and conditional
responsiveness.
Evidence for Responsiveness
While it is difficult to disentangle the relative influence of these mechanisms for policy
responsiveness—all or none may be true to some degree—an essential and answerable
question remains: does public policy reflect public opinion? Although I apply this question
to issues of education, it is rooted in the larger study of policy responsiveness. At the national
level, Page and Shapiro (1983) investigate the extent to which changes in federal spending
preferences on a number of issues are succeeded by actual changes in federal expenditures,
finding corresponding movement roughly two-thirds of the time. Erikson, MacKuen, and
Stimson (2002) shift away from studying individual policies and spending levels, suggesting
that it might be more useful to analyze the relationship between overall political mood (a
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population-level ideology measure) and an ideologically indexed composite of issues. Given
Americans’ generally low levels of policy knowledge, they believe it makes more sense to look
at larger ideological responsiveness. They find that an increase in liberal mood is typically
followed by more liberal laws and more public spending, and an increase in conservative mood
is typically followed by more conservative laws and less public spending. This is sometimes
referred to as the thermostatic model, which has two mutually reinforcing components.
First, changes in the ideological tenor of public opinion are met with ideologically consistent
changes in public policy. Second, changes in public policy affect public opinion: increasingly
liberal policies and spending patterns induce less desire for left-leaning government action,
and increasingly conservative policies and spending patterns induce less desire for right-
leaning government action (Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Wlezien 1995).
The scholarly community held for decades that state policy, which receives little media
coverage and generates low electoral turnout, tends to be less responsive than federal policy.
However, by pooling survey responses across multiple years (enough to generate sufficient
samples for each state), Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) demonstrate that state policies
are indeed highly responsive to the ideological preferences of their citizens. More liberal
states tend to have more liberal policies/greater public spending and more conservative
states tend to have more conservative policies/less public spending. Lax and Phillips (2009a;
2012) employ a statistical procedure known as multilevel regression and poststratification
to estimate state level policy preferences at a single point in time. This allows them to
analyze not only policy responsiveness (which is identified by any positive correlation between
preferences and policy) but also policy congruence (which measures the extent to which
policies match the preferences of the majority in a given jurisdiction). Across a range of
policy domains, Lax and Phillips find reliable evidence for policy responsiveness, but they
also find a “democratic deficit.” Actual policy matches majority opinion only about half of
the time.
Also using a multilevel model to estimate subnational preferences, Berkman and Plutzer
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(2005) make use of the vast number of elementary and secondary school districts in the
country—roughly 10,000—to construct a cross-sectional analysis of policy responsiveness at
one of the smallest and most familiar levels of government: local public school systems. They
find evidence for education spending responsiveness at the school district level. On average,
higher rates of districtwide support for increased spending are associated with higher local
per pupil expenditures.
Unequal Responsiveness
Most of the existing policy responsiveness literature, in keeping with its empirical interest in
democratic principles, focuses on the preferences of the majority. Yet the American style of
democracy holds dear two distinct and often competing values: majority rule and minority
rights. Both are imperfect ideals. It is not unequivocally desirable that public policy should
always reflect the will of the majority, but prominent democratic thinkers have also inveighed
against the unfettered power of small factions (Madison 1787; de Tocqueville [1835] 1945).
In addition to the normative concerns raised, this underlying conflict presents two empirical
questions: 1) to what extent does responsiveness to majority preferences obscure consistent
unresponsiveness to minority groups and 2) to what extent is responsiveness being driven
by the preferences of a single, small group?
The first question has eluded researchers for some time. Although subgroup analyses
reveal small but noteworthy differences in average preferences between groups, preference
change tends to occur in parallel (i.e. although blacks generally support higher domestic
spending than whites, both groups’ preferences tend to rise and fall together over time
and across states) (Page and Shapiro 1992). Therefore, policy responsiveness, which is
captured with a simple correlation or a regression coefficient between policy support and
policy enactment, tends to appear equal across groups—even if one group more frequently
sees its preferences enacted into policy.
Consider a hypothetical example. Over the last two years, State X increased per pupil
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expenditures while State Y did not. This is consistent with statewide public opinion, in
which support for increased education spending is stronger in State X than in State Y. In
both states, blacks have higher rates of support for increased spending than whites. In State
X, 80 percent of blacks and 60 percent of whites support increased spending. In State Y, 60
percent of blacks and 40 percent of whites support increased spending. In this case, a simple
correlation would reveal policy responsiveness at the same level for both groups: increased
support is related to increased spending. However, a majority of whites in both states
experience policies aligned with their preferences while a majority of blacks only see their
preferences enacted into policy in one state. With the ability to estimate levels of subgroup
support for specific policies within single jurisdictions, it is now possible to measure the
extent to which policies match subgroup preferences.
The second question—is responsiveness being driven by a single group—has seen a
recent burst of scholarly activity. In a series of books and articles, researchers have found
that Congressional roll call votes align more closely with the preferences of the wealthy
than to the preferences of the poor and that enacted policy, both at the state and the
national level, displays much higher responsiveness to higher income classes (Gilens 2005,
2012; Bartels 2008; Rigby and Wright 2011). One challenge here is that the preferences of
the wealthy and the poor are not always that different, and, as stated above, when they shift
they tend to shift in the same direction (Bhatti and Erikson 2011; Stimson 2011). As with
most social phenomena, in public opinion there is typically far more variation within groups
than between groups. It can be enormously difficult to disentangle the differential influence
of policy preferences by income category when there is little between-group variation. One
fruitful opportunity for research is to focus on the rare instances in which opinion bifurcates
based on income. For example, there are large and noteworthy differences in support for
welfare programs. Perhaps unsurprisingly, American public policy tends to conform to the
preferences of the wealthy in this area (Gilens 2012).
The question remains as to why the preferences of the rich and the poor overlap so
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much. This enters controversial territory, raising issues of preference manipulation and false
consciousness. Lukes ([1974] 2005) conceptualizes three different “faces” of power. The first
face of power (the ability to get someone to do something that they otherwise would not
have done) and the second face of power (the ability to prevent certain issues from appearing
on the agenda or certain groups from participating in the political process) fit into our
conventional understanding of political power and its uses. The third face of power is the
ability to convince an individual or group that their political interests run counter to their
underlying true interests. Identifying the third face of power places a considerable burden
on the analyst, who must not only argue that people have hidden true interests that he or
she can recognize but also that some third party is conspiring to manipulate these people.
While it is not impossible or even implausible that some level of such unsavory activity
occurs, it may be far more effective and straightforward to assume that, for most people
and for most issues, individuals themselves remain the best authority on their own interests.
That is the approach I adopt in this paper. My investigation of policy responsiveness—and
particularly unequal responsiveness—is conditional on the assumption that the measurement
error present in public opinion surveys is not differentially biased by social group. In other
words, I assume that public opinion surveys are able to record the policy preferences of both
disadvantaged and advantaged groups with roughly the same level of fidelity. The extent to
which some groups’ observed preferences are potentially inaccurate representations of their
underlying true preferences remains a topic for another study.
Conditional Responsiveness
A crucial subtopic in the study of policy responsiveness is the investigation of the political
conditions under which democratic government is more or less responsive to its constituents.
A common complaint in American politics is the pernicious influence of special interest
groups. This line of attack follows from the premise that organized interest groups have the
potential to subvert the link between the preferences of most Americans and enacted policy.
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However, lumping all interest groups together is conceptually na¨ıve. In nearly every policy
arena, interest groups pursue distinct and often competing ends. The question of interest
group influence is better addressed at the scale of a single policy domain or even a single
issue. Because this study focuses on education spending, it would be instructive to consider
the extent to which one of the primary interest groups in education policy, teachers unions,
either facilitate or inhibit policy responsiveness.
Nearly all state and local K–12 public teachers unions are affiliates of one of the
two large national unions: the National Education Association (NEA) and the American
Federation of Teachers (AFT). These two unions have a combined membership of over four
million teachers and education support providers. Together, they spend more than any other
public sector union on political lobbying at the federal level (Center for Responsive Politics
2014). However, teacher union political muscle varies tremendously by state. There are
limits on unions’ ability to collect membership dues in 25 states, and collective bargaining is
prohibited altogether in five states (National Council on Teacher Quality 2014). Moreover,
within the context of these formal rights and limitations, there is extensive variation in the
perceived political influence of teachers unions by state (Winkler, Scull, and Zeehandelaar
2012).
There is a broad academic literature on the ways in which teachers unions are able
to influence education policy. The two major pathways through which this impact occurs
are collective bargaining and political organizing (Cowen and Strunk 2014). In their role
as collective bargaining agents, unions are able to negotiate with local school districts,
school boards, and state departments of education over salaries and working conditions. As
political actors, unions can use their size and resources to affect elections, support or oppose
proposed education policy changes, and wield influence over local school boards. There
is considerable evidence that teachers unions successfully exercise these powers to induce
greater public spending on education and shape other personnel policies. Multiple studies
suggest that increased unionization is associated with increased spending on education in
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general and teachers salaries in particular (Baugh and Stone 1982; Brunner and Squires 2013;
Cowen 2009; Duplantis, Chandler, and Geske 1995; Easton 1988; Eberts 1983; Eberts and
Stone 1984; Freeman 1986; Hoxby 1996; Kaspar 1970; Kleiner and Petree 1988; Lott and
Kenny 2013; Lovenheim 2009; Zigarelli 1996). Other research posits that teachers unions
have successfully leveraged collective bargaining agreements to influence teacher evaluation
policies, teacher placement, layoffs, and class sizes (Hess and Loup 2008; Moe 2009; Strunk
2012).
Moe (2001) suggests that 1) the interests of teachers are often in conflict with the
interests of students and families, and 2) teachers unions benefit from unusual electoral
arrangements that allow them to pursue those interests unchecked. For example, he contends
that teachers unions fight to maintain personnel and salary policies that minimize the extent
to which members are evaluated based on performance, and they actively resist policies that
allow for the removal of low-performing teachers. Moreover, the unions have outsize influence
on school board elections because they are held during off years (resulting in low turnout
among general voters) and because school board elections are often nonpartisan (removing
otherwise useful ideological cues to individuals without organized guidance on how to vote).
Moe (2011, 8) argues that the two national teachers unions, the NEA and the AFT, are “the
most powerful groups in the politics of education . . . No other groups have even been in the
same ballpark.” In this view, teachers unions exert unrivaled sway over education policy,
minimizing the influence of other political interests.
With respect to policy responsiveness, the influence of powerful groups like teachers
unions could cut either way. If the interests of teachers and the interests of the community
diverge, then unions’ capacity to pursue teachers’ interests at the expense of other goals could
undermine responsiveness. If, on the other hand, there is alignment in these preferences,
then stronger unions could be the very medium through which responsiveness is effected.
In their analysis of the link between district level education spending preferences and local
per pupil expenditures, Berkman and Plutzer (2005) find no variation in this relationship by
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the strength of local teachers unions. They agree with the existing academic literature
that school districts with large and influential teachers unions tend to spend more per
pupil; however, they find no link between teachers union strength and support for increased
education spending. District spending preferences align with union priorities about as often
as district spending preferences oppose union priorities. The notion that teachers unions
systematically subvert the will of the people may not be applicable in this case.
Methodology
Research Questions
There are three sets of questions that guide this study:
1. Is there a relationship between statewide public opinion on support for increased
education spending and actual statewide per pupil expenditures? At a given time,
do states with greater support for education spending actually spend more per pupil?
Within states over time, are increases in support associated with increases in spending?
What is the nature of this relationship after controlling for between-state differences
and common trends across states over time?
2. Does this relationship differ for historically advantaged and disadvantaged subgroups?
Specifically, are individuals from the upper third of the income distribution more likely
than individuals from the bottom two-thirds of the income distribution to experience
education spending levels consistent with their preferences? Are whites more likely than
non-whites to experience education spending levels consistent with their preferences?
3. Does state level education spending responsiveness vary by the size and influence
of teachers unions in each state? Are states with stronger-than-average or weaker-




The chief obstacle in the pursuit of these questions is the absence of high quality state
level measures of education spending preferences. The increasingly standard approach to
estimating subnational public opinion in political science is the use of multilevel regression
and poststratification (MRP). MRP employs nationally representative survey data in a
multilevel logistic regression model in which individual survey responses are a function of
both demographic and geographic predictors (Kastellec, Lax, and Phillips 2016; Lax and
Phillips 2009b; Park, Gelman, and Bafumi 2004). This approach allows the researcher to
calculate predicted probabilities of policy support among specific demographic-geographic
types (e.g., 45–64 year old Hispanic women in Texas with some college education). These
predicted probabilities are then multiplied by Census counts of each demographic category
in each state, producing an estimate of the number of individuals in each state that support
a given policy. The researcher then divides by the total number of applicable individuals
statewide to estimate state level support for that policy. To generate an estimate of subgroup
support (i.e. among non-white citizens), one divides the estimated number of supporters
within the subgroup by the total number of individuals in the subgroup.
In order to fit a multilevel model of state level education spending preferences over
an extended time series, I need to use a longitudinal survey that contains individual level
demographic variables, state identifiers, and a consistently worded question on attitudes
towards education spending. There are two surveys that meet these criteria: the American
National Election Study (ANES) and the General Social Survey (GSS).1
Both surveys contain features that generate challenges for this study. The first concern
relates to question wording. The two questions are as follows:
1. ANES : Should federal spending on public schools be increased, decreased, or kept
about the same? (Increased, Same, Decreased, Don’t Know)
1 The GSS records respondents’ state of residence, but these are restricted-use data. NORC at the University
of Chicago generously provided access to these data.
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2. GSS : Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on improving
the nation’s education system? (Too Little, About Right, Too Much, Don’t Know)
The GSS question inverts the answer options: asking respondents if we “spend too little” as
opposed to asking them if we spending should be “increased.” Minor changes in the structure
of survey questions—even if the content is logically equivalent—can have nontrivial effects on
the distribution of responses (Schuman and Presser 1981). Moreover, the ANES question on
education spending preferences refers to support for increased federal spending on education,
whereas the GSS question format refers to the nation’s education system. Berkman and
Plutzer (2005) show that the ANES question format deflates support among high income
respondents (likely as a result of greater conservatism among more affluent individuals).
Neither survey specifically asks whether respondents support increased education spending
in their state. However, Berkman and Plutzer also demonstrate that the answers to the
ANES and GSS questions largely mimic the answers to more context-specific questions posed
by smaller, non-longitudinal surveys. They argue that this consistency indicates that all of
the questions are tapping into a broader notion: a general “taste” for education spending.
To reduce the idiosyncratic effects of question wording, I pool the data from both surveys
for my analyses. I recode responses so that expressing a preference for increasing spending
on public schools or suggesting that we spend too little on the nation’s education system
are both coded as 1 (0 otherwise). Therefore, when applying the first stage of MRP, I am
estimating the predicted probability of supporting increased spending on education, broadly
defined.
The second concern about the GSS and the ANES is related to their sampling designs.
Both surveys employ cluster random sampling in order to obtain a nationally representative
sample while minimizing some of the logistical challenges of reaching respondents where
they live (both the GSS and the ANES conduct in-person interviews). As a result, the
respondents selected within each state are not a representative sample of that state. Consider
a hypothetical example: in a given survey administration, all of the respondents from New
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York State could be located in a single cluster in New York City. As diverse as New York
City may be, it is not reflective of the whole state. Therefore, na¨ıve estimates of public
opinion in New York State would be dependent on an unusual subset of New Yorkers.
I address this issue in five ways. First, as previously mentioned, I pool data from
both the GSS and the ANES, which use different sampling frames in a given year. This
approach both increases my subsamples in each state and decreases the likelihood that all
respondents from the same state are drawn from the same cluster. Second, to estimate state
level public opinion in year t, I employ a simple moving average that pools survey data from
five years (t ± 2), which further diversifies my state subsamples. Third, when estimating
predicted probabilities of support, the multilevel models I use rely on data from the whole
sample while allowing the intercept to shift slightly for each state. This attenuates the
influence of an unusual group of respondents from a single state in favor of patterns observed
across all of the data. Fourth, my models include a state level predictor (a measure of state
political ideology) and a set of U.S. Census region indicators, which shape the magnitude and
direction of the relationships between state of residence and support for increased education
spending. Fifth, the differences in state level estimates of public opinion are also influenced
by differences in the demographic composition of those states, which come into play during
the “poststratification” part of MRP and are independent of survey samples. The upshot is
that the final state level public opinion estimates are less likely to be skewed by an unusual
sample in a given state in a given year (see Stollwerk 2013 for more information on using
MRP with cluster-sampled polls).
One final concern about these survey questions relates to their omission of any policy
trade-offs. Increases in education spending would typically come at the expense of less
spending on other policy domains, higher taxes, or increases in government deficits. Indeed,
support for increased education spending declines when these trade-offs are mentioned in
the question itself (Schueler and West 2016). I concede that the estimates of public opinion
captured by the GSS and ANES survey questions may be somewhat inflated. On the
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other hand, the relative support for increased education spending between states ought
to be fairly consistent across question wordings. In other words, my estimates of public
opinion in California and Kansas using the GSS and ANES questions may both be higher
than analogous estimates using questions that identify policy trade-offs, but I would expect
California to have a higher level of support than Kansas in both versions. Because my
analyses rely primarily on between-state and within-state comparisons, the absolute levels
of support for increased education spending are less pertinent.
Because of the GSS’ and ANES’ use of identical question wording over multiple survey
administrations, I can generate statewide population and subgroup estimates of support for
increased education spending for each year from 1984 to 2013.2 For a dependent variable, I
rely on the National Center for Education Statistics Common Core of Data (NCES CCD),
which includes statewide per pupil expenditures for K–12 public schools from the 1986–
1987 academic year to the 2013–2014 academic year. To assemble Census counts for each
demographic-geographic category, I use the U.S. Census Integrated Public Use Microdata
Series (IPUMS) from the 1990 Census (one percent sample), the 2000 Census (one percent
sample), and the 2010 American Community Survey (five percent sample). For a measure
of the power and influence of state teachers unions, I use the Fordham Institute ratings of
teachers union strength (Winklery, Scull, and Zeehandelaar 2012). This is a composite index
of 37 variables tracking resources, membership, political involvement, scope of bargaining,
state policies, and perceived influence. Three of these variables also capture elements of state
level education spending.3 Therefore, I recalculate this index for each state after excluding
those variables.
2 GSS data are available for every even-numbered year. ANES data are available for every presidential
election year and some midterm election years. Both GSS and ANES data are available for a longer time
series, but equivalent statewide per pupil expenditure data are only available from 1986–2013. To calculate
the national public opinion trend (see figure 2.1), I use all available data from 1980 onwards.
3 Sub-Indicator 1.3.1: Annual % of each state’s general budget that is spent on K–12 education
Sub-Indicator 1.3.2: Total annual per-pupil expenditures per state
Sub-Indicator 1.3.3: Annual % of the total K-12 expenditures directed to teacher salaries and benefits
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Analytic Approach
To increase the number of respondents in each demographic-geographic category and to
reduce the influence of unusual state samples in a given survey administration, I employ a
simple moving average in which values for year t are drawn from data pooled over a five year
period (t± 2) (Pacheco 2011). All monetary values are inflation-adjusted to 2017 dollars.
The analysis begins with a simple regression of average per pupil expenditures (PPE)
on nationwide support for increased spending in a given year using the following equation:
AvgPPEt = β0 + β1Nat Supportt + t, (2.1)
where AvgPPE is the average of state PPE in each year (with and without a two year lag),
Nat Support is the percent of U.S. adults that support increased education spending in each
year, and  is the error term in year t. I drop subjects with missing data from my analysis.
The values from this model represent the views of individuals who answered the education
spending question.
I then estimate state level public opinion. First, I examine the demographic and
geographic predictors of support for increased education spending. For each five year time
period (year t ± 2), I fit a separate multilevel logistic regression equation in which support
for increased education spending (dichotomous) is a function of educational attainment (less
than high school, high school, some college, or college); race (white or non-white); sex
(female or male); age (18–44, 45–64, and 65+); U.S. state of residence; the percentage of
state residents who identify as liberal4 (standardized); U.S. Census region; and poll (GSS
or ANES); with varying intercepts by state and varying slopes by race in each state. I
drop subjects with missing data from my analysis. The values from this model represent
the views of individuals who answered the education spending and demographic questions.
Earlier analyses also included family income terciles and more finely-grained age categories,
4 The state political ideology data come from Pacheco (2011). For each state, I average the values over the
available time series (1976–2006).
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but the coefficients for these predictors were small (≤|.05|), often non-significant, and had
inconsistently signed relationships with support for increased education spending from year
to year. I omit them in favor of model parsimony.
Next, using a separate multilevel model for each year in the time series, I generate pre-
dicted probabilities of support for increased education spending for 48 different demographic
categories in each state (e.g., a 45–64 year old, white female with a high school degree from
Tennessee) with the equation:
Pr(Y = 1) = logit−1(Educisr +Race Stateisr + Sexisr + Ageisr +
Liberalsr + Statesr +Regionr), (2.2)
in which each named variable represents the applicable logistic regression coefficient for that
variable for individual type i in state s and region r. By excluding the poll coefficient,
I default to a slightly lower probability of supporting increased education spending (Poll
is an indicator variable for cases from the GSS, wherein the question wording is typically
associated with higher support).
I weight these predicted probabilities of support by U.S. Census counts of each
demographic category in each state to estimate statewide levels of support for increased
education spending. I generate subgroup estimates of support by dividing the predicted
number of supporters in each subgroup by the total number of adults in that subgroup.
To evaluate state level education spending responsiveness, I fit a series of OLS
regressions that take the form:
Yst = β0 + β1State Supportst + States + Y eart + st, (2.3)
where Y is the outcome (either state PPE in year t, state PPE in year t+2, or the change in
state PPE from year t to year t+2); State Support is the percentage of the state population
that supports increased education spending; State are state fixed effects; Y ear are year fixed
effects; and  is the error term in state s and year t.
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Lastly, to explore how the relationship between state level public opinion and education
spending varies by the strength of state teachers unions, I reduce the data to a single time
period (2000–2010) to match the same years captured by the Fordham Institute teachers
union index. I recalculate this index to exclude indicators related to state education spending,
and I compare teachers union strength to both state PPE and state level support for increased
education spending averaged over the same time frame. I then split the sample into two
groups by average teacher union strength. With these two subsamples, I fit a series of OLS
regressions that take the form:
Ys = β0 + β1State Supports + s, (2.4)
where Y is the outcome (teachers union strength or average state PPE), State Support is
the average percentage of the state population that supports increased education spending,
and  is the error term in state s. Using the whole sample, I also regress average state PPE
on state support, teachers union strength, and an interaction between the two.
Findings
I begin by providing some nationwide context for the relationship between public opinion
on education spending and actual spending levels. Next, I generate state level estimates
of support for increased education spending. Using these estimates, I explore policy
responsiveness in three ways: 1) the relationship between public opinion and spending across
states in a given year, 2) the relationship between public opinion and spending within states
over time, and 3) the relationship between public opinion and spending after controlling
for between-state differences and common trends across states over time. I then investigate
whether these relationships differ for whites and non-whites. I forgo an examination of
unequal responsiveness by income because of the absence of income-based cleavages in public
opinion on this issue. Lastly, I explore how education spending responsiveness varies by the
strength of state teachers unions.
49
Nationwide Education Spending Responsiveness
Figure 2.1 displays the nationwide trend of support for increased education spending
compared to the average state PPE in each year. To calculate support for increased spending
in year t, I take a simple moving average from both the GSS and the ANES over five year
periods (t±2) and then take an average of poll averages. I use the NCES CCD to calculate the
average state PPE in each year. Broadly speaking, support for increased education spending
is robust, ranging from about 57 percent in 1982 to about 76 percent in 2008. Average state
PPE ranges from about $8,155 in 1986 to about $12,664 in 2009 (inflation-adjusted to 2017
dollars). Both support for spending and actual spending have gradually increased over time
with a notable drop-off beginning in 2010.
This relationship is quantified in Table 2.1. A one percentage point increase in support
for education spending is associated with a roughly $289 increase in average state PPE.
The same basic pattern holds when I explore the relationship between public opinion and
education spending with a two year lag. These larger macro trends in public opinion
and spending are important to note as they complicate the interpretation of within-state
Figure 2.1: National Public Opinion on Education Spending and Actual Spending













































% Supporting Increased Spending (Left Axis)
Avg State PPE (Right Axis)
Notes: Total n = 70,060 for public opinion trend. Sources: GSS, ANES, and NCES CCD
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Table 2.1: Nationwide Education Spending Responsiveness
Avg State PPE Avg State PPE
(2 Year Lag)
% Support for Increased Spending 289.10 260.80
(54.21) (30.18)
N 28 28
Notes: Values are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; units are nation-years.
Sources: GSS, ANES, and NCES CCD
responsiveness over time. If support for increased education spending and actual spending
are both rising across the board, it can be easy to mistake a positive relationship between
the two at the state level as a uniquely state-based phenomenon.
Figure 2.2 disaggregates the nationwide public opinion trend by family income tercile
and by race (white and non-white5). When dividing the subject pool by income, I find no
meaningful between-group differences. It may be the case that extremely high income or
extremely low income individuals have divergent views on education spending, but there
are no major income-based cleavages in public opinion on this issue when considering broad
Figure 2.2: National Public Opinion on Education Spending by Income and Race
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Notes: Total n = 62,762 for Family Income and Total n = 69,890 for Race. Sources: GSS and ANES
5 I use a simple white/non-white binary to represent racial differences in order to maintain cell density in each
demographic category in each state. This coarse categorization is likely to conceal some racial variation in
attitudes towards education spending. On the other hand, blacks, Hispanics, and other non-whites are all
more likely to support increased education spending than their white peers.
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income categories. As a result, this study forgoes an analysis of unequal responsiveness by
income. Alternatively, there appears to be nontrivial racial differences in public opinion.
Non-whites are more likely to support increased education spending than whites. This
pattern is consistent across all years, including the downward trend beginning in 2010. While
this divergence makes it conceivable that there could be unequal responsiveness by race, the
racial trend lines move at a roughly parallel rate and neither ever dips below 50 percent. I
explore the possibility of variation in state level policy responsiveness by race in this paper,
but the basic opinion dynamic here—in which the majority of individuals in both groups
in all time periods favor the same thing at the national level—does not lend itself to such
inequality.
Estimating State Level Public Opinion
The relationships between a series of demographic characteristics and support for increased
education spending are displayed in Table 2.2. The models also generate varying intercepts
by state and varying slopes by race in each state, but these coefficients are omitted from the
table for ease of presentation. Support for education spending is positively associated with
increases in educational attainment, identifying as a racial group other than white, identifying
as female, and living in a state with a higher percentage of self-identified liberals. Support
for education spending decreases with age. All else equal, individuals in the South generally
have greater support for more education spending than those in other U.S. Census regions.
The GSS question wording is associated with more favorable stances towards education
spending than the ANES question wording. Model 2 presents the results of the final model
used to predict support for increased education spending. Table 2.2 also displays the results
of Model 1, which includes family income terciles and more finely-grained age categories.
The coefficients for these predictors are small (≤ |.05|), often non-significant, and have
inconsistently signed relationships with support for increased education spending from year
to year. I omit them in favor of model parsimony.
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Table 2.2: Predicting Public Opinion on Education Spending
Support for Increased Education Spending
(1) (2)
High School 0.28 (0.03) 0.30 (0.03)
Some College 0.43 (0.03) 0.44 (0.03)
College+ 0.39 (0.03) 0.40 (0.03)
Non-White 0.52 (0.04) 0.51(0.04)
Female 0.29 (0.02) 0.28 (0.02)
Middle 1/3 Income 0.05 (0.02)
Upper 1/3 Income -0.01 (0.03)
Age 30–44 -0.05 (0.03)
Age 45–64 -0.42 (0.03) -0.40 (0.02)
Age 65+ -0.84 (0.03) -0.80 (0.02)
State % Liberal (Standardized) 0.08 (0.03) 0.08 (0.03)
Northeast -0.05 (0.07) -0.03 (0.07)
South 0.24 (0.06) 0.25 (0.05)
West 0.05 (0.07) 0.09 (0.07)
GSS 0.30 (0.03) 0.28 (0.02)
Year FE Yes Yes
Intercept Varies by State Yes Yes
Non-White Coefficient Varies by State Yes Yes
N 62,224 69,260
Notes: Values are logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; units are individual
survey respondents; educational attainment categories compared to Less Than High School; income
categories compared to the lower third of the income distribution; age categories compared to 18–29
(Model 1) or 18–44 (Model 2); U.S. Census regions compared to Midwest; GSS compared to ANES.
Sources: GSS, ANES, and Pacheco (2011)
I fit an analogous model for each year from 1984 to 2013, pooling available survey
data from the two years before and after each year. I then use the estimated values from
these multilevel logistic regression models to generate predicted probabilities of supporting
increased education spending for 48 demographic categories in each state and the District
of Columbia in each year (for a total of 73,440 separate categories). I then weight these
probabilities by U.S. Census counts of each demographic category in each state in each year
to estimate statewide levels of support for increased education spending. For 1984–1994, I
rely on the 1990 Census (one percent sample); for 1995–2004, I rely on the 2000 Census (one
percent sample); and for 2005–2013, I rely on the 2010 American Community Survey (five
percent sample). These estimates are displayed in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3: State Level Public Opinion on Education Spending
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Sources: GSS, ANES, IPUMS, and Pacheco (2011)
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Statewide support for increased education spending ranges from about 42 percent in
1985 (Kansas) to about 84 percent in 2008 (DC). After 1986, a majority of adults in all
states support increased spending, but there is considerable variation in the level of support
between states. Overall, state level public opinion tracks the national trend, with a gradual
increase in support until 2009 and a sharp downtick thereafter. With the exception of the
2010 decline, state level opinion is fairly stable over time. I observe only minor changes from
year to year. Support for more education spending is highest in liberal and racially diverse
states like California, Maryland, Hawaii, and DC. Support is lowest in states with older,
whiter, and more conservative populations, such as Wisconsin, Kansas, and the Dakotas.
Table 2.3: State Level Support for Increased Education Spending
Year Mean Median SD Min Max
1984 52.73 53.11 4.86 42.85 67.06
1985 52.34 53.20 5.07 42.41 69.91
1986 57.71 58.16 5.08 47.09 74.22
1987 62.60 62.36 4.65 53.77 78.01
1988 62.15 62.27 4.67 53.32 77.17
1989 62.12 62.19 4.87 52.05 75.70
1990 62.56 63.17 5.30 51.71 74.19
1991 62.81 63.64 5.00 51.48 76.39
1992 63.38 63.65 5.02 53.04 77.77
1993 64.04 64.43 5.24 55.07 80.20
1994 64.49 65.23 5.33 55.00 81.23
1995 65.42 65.89 5.14 56.33 82.11
1996 65.62 65.74 4.62 57.31 79.79
1997 66.15 66.06 4.29 58.26 78.61
1998 70.50 71.05 3.98 63.41 80.73
1999 74.58 75.20 3.17 67.56 81.23
2000 73.90 73.89 3.10 67.21 79.48
2001 73.77 74.24 3.19 66.76 79.67
2002 74.03 74.17 3.08 66.81 81.10
2003 73.60 73.50 2.55 68.98 80.81
2004 73.72 73.53 2.14 69.55 80.52
2005 74.00 73.59 2.31 69.73 81.78
2006 74.39 74.54 2.72 68.73 83.09
2007 75.01 74.62 2.60 69.77 83.89
2008 75.33 74.83 2.97 69.82 83.99
2009 74.33 74.57 3.88 66.50 83.19
2010 63.26 63.00 5.12 53.33 79.71
2011 59.87 59.35 4.86 50.67 76.46
2012 60.16 59.68 4.60 51.87 76.39
2013 59.77 59.93 4.82 51.94 77.80
Sources: GSS, ANES, IPUMS, and Pacheco (2011)
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Table 2.3 summarizes this information for each year in the time series. Across all
50 states and DC, average support for increased education spending ranges from about 52
percent in 1985 to about 75 percent in 2008. The dispersion of state level public opinion
varies over time. The time series begins with a standard deviation of about five percentage
points in the 80’s and 90’s. States converge towards the average as support for education
spending grows in the early 00’s, but they disperse once more after the 2010 drop.
I also disaggregate state level support for education spending by race by dividing the
number of estimated white/non-white supporters by the total number of adults in each group.
Non-whites are more supportive of increased spending than whites in all states, but the racial
gap varies from state to state. These differences can be observed in Figure 2.4. In this graph,
each group of bars represents the average state level support for increased education spending
from 1984 to 2013 for all adults, white adults, and non-white adults. The states are sorted
by the average public opinion among all adults. States near the top of the graph tend to
have wider racial gaps. White support for increased education spending in older, less diverse,
and more conservative states is notably weaker than white support in states with a higher
percentage of liberals and nonwhites. The lower support for increased education spending
among whites in whiter states tends to pull the overall state level estimate in that direction.
Conversely, state level public opinion more closely tracks the views of non-whites in more
diverse states like New Mexico, California, and Hawaii.
Figure 2.5 explores the relationship between white and non-white public opinion in
each state and year. If there were no racial gaps on this issue, the cloud of data would fall
neatly along the 45° diagonal line. This is not the case: all but one data point fall above
the line, indicating higher support for increased education spending among non-whites in
each state and year. However, the relationship between white and non-white public opinion
is linear, and its trajectory runs roughly parallel to the 45° diagonal. This indicates that
support for increased education spending tends to shift in a parallel fashion among whites
and non-whites. As public opinion rises in one group, it tends to rise in the other group as
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Figure 2.4: Average State Level Public Opinion by Race
Avg % Supporting Increased Spending (1984−2013)






















































Sources: GSS, ANES, IPUMS, and Pacheco (2011)
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Figure 2.5: State Level Public Opinion and Race
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Sources: GSS, ANES, IPUMS, and Pacheco (2011)
well. When support for increased education spending declines, it tends to decline for both
whites and non-whites at a similar rate. Moreover, a majority of non-whites in nearly all
states and years support increased education spending. With the exception of a small subset
of state-year combinations on the far left tail of the scatterplot, the same is true among
whites. This pattern is similar to the racial dynamic at the national level (see Figure 2.2).
Despite different levels of support between whites and non-whites, a majority of both groups
seek greater spending on education, and changes in the level of support tend to occur in
parallel.
Evidence of State Level Responsiveness
Figure 2.6 displays the relationships between support for increased education spending and
state PPE within each year. Consistent with the nationwide pattern, both public opinion
and education spending trend upwards until 2009, followed by a shift downwards. In 22
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Sources: GSS, ANES, IPUMS, NCES CCD, and Pacheco (2011)
out of 28 years, there is a positive relationship between public opinion and actual spending
levels. This pattern provides the initial evidence in favor of cross-sectional responsiveness.
In most years, states with higher levels of support for increased spending also tend to have
higher spending levels per pupil. However, the positive relationship is modest and only
occasionally statistically significant. In six of the 28 years, the relationship flips and turns
slightly negative. In all years, there are states with relatively high levels of support for
increased education spending but relatively low actual spending levels. The reverse is also
true: some states with relatively low levels of support actually spend fairly generously.
Within states over time, greater support for increased education spending is clearly
associated with higher state PPE (Figure 2.7). In the majority of states, there is a
visually apparent linear relationship between the two. I refer to this dynamic as longitudinal
responsiveness. In some states, the data take the form of a backwards “C.” The upper portion
of this shape tends to come from 2010–2013, in which a sharp decline in public opinion is
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met with only a modest decline in spending. I harbor some skepticism as to whether this
descriptive evidence for longitudinal responsiveness represents a causal relationship (i.e. that
states are deliberately responding to changes in public opinion with increases in per pupil
expenditures). Rather, it is quite plausible that both state level public opinion and spending
levels are simply tracking larger, national trends.
I explore these relationships in more detail in Table 2.4. Panel A displays the
relationships between support for increased education spending among all adults in each
state and a series of outcomes: state PPE, state PPE with a two year lag, and changes in
state PPE over two years. Model 1 quantifies the average relationship displayed in Figure
2.6: there is a modest, positive relationship between public opinion and education spending
between states in a given year. A one percentage point increase in support for more education
spending is associated with about a $39 increase in state PPE. Model 2 quantifies the average
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Table 2.4: State Level Responsiveness
State PPE State PPE (2 Year Lag) ∆ State PPE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: All Adults
% Support 39.45 98.73 -33.07 32.15 153.54 -50.03 -2.00 11.55 -16.81
(16.70) (6.87) (11.45) (17.73) (6.18) (11.63) (3.25) (2.60) (6.49)
Adj. R2 0.23 0.71 0.92 0.21 0.79 0.92 0.31 0.05 0.36
Panel B: Whites
% Support 45.04 87.84 -35.21 33.55 143.33 -51.84 -1.98 11.77 -14.96
(20.03) (6.72) (11.50) (21.16) (6.13) (11.68) (3.88) (2.53) (6.52)
Adj. R2 0.23 0.70 0.92 0.21 0.78 0.92 0.31 0.05 0.36
Panel C: Non-Whites
% Support 112.50 118.64 -13.01 101.13 185.47 -25.04 1.53 11.38 -9.56
(25.86) (8.50) (10.90) (27.35) (7.76) (11.03) (5.03) (3.23) (6.13)
Adj. R2 0.24 0.71 0.92 0.21 0.79 0.92 0.31 0.04 0.36
All Panels
Year FE Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
State FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,326 1,326 1,326 1,326 1,326 1,326
Notes: Values are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; units are state-years.
Sources: GSS, ANES, IPUMS, NCES CCD, and Pacheco (2011)
relationship displayed in Figure 2.7: there is a large, positive relationship between public
opinion and education spending within states over time. On average, a one percentage point
increase in support for more education spending in a given state is associated with about a
$99 increase in state PPE. These results reiterate the graphical evidence for cross-sectional
and longitudinal responsiveness.
Both of these preliminary findings are potentially misleading. Cross-sectional respon-
siveness may be failing to account for long-term trends within each state, and longitudinal
responsiveness may be capturing processes that affect all states in the country in a given
year. Model 3 presents the same relationship after including both year and state fixed effects.
In this context, I observe a modest, negative relationship. After controlling for between-state
differences and common trends across states over time, a one percentage point increase in
support for more education spending is associated with $33 less per pupil. In circumstances
in which spending levels are low relative to the state average and low relative to the year
average, support for increased education spending tends to be high for that state and year.
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In other words, after accounting for baseline differences in spending levels between states and
the rising rates of spending common to all states, there is unmet demand for more money
to be spent on public schools.
Models 4–6 explore these dynamics with a lagged dependent variable. The same pattern
persists, but the relationships are similar or slightly magnified. Models 7–9 examine the
relationship between public opinion and changes in state PPE over time. Within each state,
a one percentage point increase in support for more education spending is associated with a
$12 larger increase in state PPE two years later (Model 8). However, after also controlling
for factors that affect all states in a given year, the negative relationship reemerges: a one
percentage point increase in support is associated with a $17 smaller increase in state PPE
two years later (Model 9). Those states that want more spending the most are getting
increases in spending at smaller rates.
I also explore whether any of these relationships differ substantially for whites and non-
whites. Panel B and Panel C replicate the same analyses for each of these subgroups within
each state. The results are generally consistent, indicating a similar pattern of responsiveness
for both groups. There are, however, some notable differences in the degree of responsiveness.
Contrary to expectations, support for increased education spending among non-whites is
slightly more predictive of state PPE, with a marginally higher R2 and steeper slopes in
both the cross-sectional (Model 1) and longitudinal (Model 2) analyses. Moreover, the
negative relationship between public opinion and education spending after including both
state and year fixed effects is smaller and non-significant for non-whites (Model 3). This is
not to suggest that non-whites tend to experience education spending levels consistent with
their preferences while whites do not. Majorities of both groups support the same thing.
However, changes in non-white public opinion on education spending tend to be associated
with larger changes in actual spending than equivalent shifts in white public opinion.
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Teachers Unions and State Level Responsiveness
What are the characteristics of states with greater and lesser degrees of education spend-
ing responsiveness? I investigate the extent to which responsiveness is conditional on the
strength of state teachers unions. Figure 2.8 displays the relationship between teachers union
strength and state level education spending as well as the relationship between teachers union
strength and state level public opinion on education spending. In both cases, I collapse the
analysis down to a single 2000–2010 time period to reflect the equivalent period over which
the data for the teachers union strength index were collected. As has been noted in the aca-
demic literature on teachers unions, the size, resources, and influence of organized educators
are some of the best predictors of education spending levels. I observe the same relationship
in my data. Alternatively, teachers union strength appears to be inversely related to support
for increased education spending. The states with less powerful teachers unions generally
have higher support for more spending on schools.
Figure 2.8: Teachers Unions, Education Spending, and Public Opinion
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Sources: GSS, ANES, IPUMS, NCES CCD, Pacheco (2011), and Fordham Institute (2012)
When I disaggregate the data by teachers union strength, the relationship between
public opinion and education spending bifurcates. Figure 2.9 displays the relationship
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Sources: GSS, ANES, IPUMS, NCES CCD, Pacheco (2011), and Fordham Institute (2012)
between public opinion and education spending separately for states with stronger-than-
average teachers unions and states with weaker-than-average teachers unions. Among states
with strong unions, greater support for increased spending is associated with modestly higher
actual spending. However, among states with weak unions, the reverse is true and to a greater
degree. The states with the weakest teachers unions have some of the lowest actual spending
levels and the highest support for more spending.
These relationships are quantified in Table 2.5. Among states with strong teachers
unions, there is essentially no relationship between public opinion and union strength or
between public opinion and actual spending (Models 1 and 2). However, among states with
weak teachers unions, both are linked (Models 3 and 4). A one percentage point increase in
support for more education spending is associated with a 0.14 standard deviation decrease
in teachers union strength. An equivalent increase in support for education spending is
also associated with a roughly $230 decline in average PPE. Model 5 indicates that the
two opinion-spending slopes diverge considerably, but the difference is only significant at
p = 0.13. This analysis provides tentative evidence in favor of the argument that teachers
union strength may be a mediating factor in the relationship between public opinion and
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Table 2.5: Teachers Union Strength and State Level Responsiveness
Above Avg Union Strength Below Avg Union Strength All States
Union Strength Avg PPE Union Strength Avg PPE Avg PPE
(Standardized) (2000–2010) (Standardized) (2000–2010) (2000–2010)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Avg % Support 0.01 176.60 -0.14 -230.38 176.60
(2000–2010) (0.03) (169.45) (0.05) (148.38) (139.07)
Avg % Support × -406.98
Below Avg Union Strength (261.42)
N 27 27 24 24 51
R2 0.01 0.04 0.29 0.10 0.37
Notes: Values are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; units are states.
Sources: GSS, ANES, IPUMS, NCES CCD, Pacheco (2011), and Fordham Institute (2012)
education spending. At least on the issue of spending, the interests of teachers unions and
the general public are relatively well aligned. Weak state teachers unions may be less able
to produce the spending gains desired by the residents of those states.
Conclusions
I find evidence of a complex relationship between statewide support for increased education
spending and actual statewide education spending per pupil. At a given time, there seems
to be a modest level of cross-sectional responsiveness. States with relatively high support for
increased education spending tend to spend a little more, and vice versa. Moreover, within
states over time, there appears to be evidence of longitudinal responsiveness. Increases in
support for education spending are associated with increases in actual spending. However,
this state level relationship may simply be a reflection of larger, national trends over time.
After controlling for both between-state differences and common trends across states in each
year, I observe a negative relationship between public opinion on education spending and
state PPE. In circumstances in which spending levels are low relative to the state average
and low relative to the year average, support for increased education spending tends to be
high for that state and year.
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This basic pattern is the same for both historically advantaged and disadvantaged
subgroups. I find no evidence that there are noteworthy cleavages in public opinion on
education spending by income level. As a result, I forgo an analysis of unequal responsiveness
by income. Alternatively, there are opinion differences by race, but a majority of both whites
and non-whites support increased education spending and the preferences of these subgroups
tend to shift in parallel. On the other hand, I observe a slightly stronger relationship between
non-white public opinion on education spending and actual spending. Changes in non-white
support for increased education spending tend to be associated with larger changes in state
PPE than equivalent changes in white support.
I also explore whether state level education spending responsiveness varies by the
strength of teachers unions in each state. Even with a small sample size of 50 states and DC,
the pattern is noticeable. States with the weakest teachers unions tend to have some of the
lowest education spending levels and some of the highest support for increased spending on
schools. This dynamic is fairly intuitive. At least in the abstract, most Americans support
more spending on education. One of the primary political goals of teachers unions is to obtain
additional education spending. Therefore, even in the absence of a direct causal relationship
between public opinion and public policy on this issue, education spending levels are more
likely to reflect education spending preferences in states with stronger teachers unions.
My findings are generally consistent with Berkman’s and Plutzer’s (2005) study of
education spending responsiveness at the school district level. Their analysis captures local
cross-sectional responsiveness. I also find evidence of a positive link between public opinion
on education spending and actual spending at the state level at a single point in time, but the
relationship is modest. In addition to shifting the unit of analysis, this study is able to build
upon Berkman’s and Plutzer’s approach by incorporating longitudinal data on public opinion
and education spending. It is only after I account for shared opinion and spending trends over
time that I observe a negative relationship between support for increased education spending
and actual spending levels. Furthermore, in contrast to their 2005 study, this analysis finds
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some evidence of variation in policy responsiveness by the strength of teachers unions. At
the state level, there appears to be alignment between the preferences of teachers unions and
ordinary citizens on the issue of education spending. Education spending responsiveness is
least pronounced in the states with weak or non-existent teachers unions.
The academic literature on policy responsiveness typically finds evidence in its favor:
for the most part, differences in enacted policies tend to reflect differences in public
opinion. This study suggests that the same is true for education—a policy domain with
institutionalized buffers between itself and many of the major actors in electoral politics.
However, this relationship is dynamic: support for increased education spending tends to
rise when spending levels are low relative to state and year averages. Moreover, the linkage
between state level public opinion and education spending may be dependent on the strength
of state teachers unions. Lastly, to the best of my knowledge, this study contains the first
application of MRP to generate state level subgroup estimates of support for a policy in order
to evaluate the extent to which states may be differentially responsive to the preferences of
those groups. In the case of education spending, I do not find extensive evidence of unequal
responsiveness, but this approach could be used more broadly to study subnational political
inequality across a range of issues.
67
Polarization and the Politics of
Education: What Moves Partisan
Opinion?
Perhaps the single most prominent trend in contemporary American politics has been the
surge in polarization over the past two decades (Pew Research Center 2014). Across an array
of issues, Democrats and Republicans have grown increasingly distinct. Compromise across
party lines is often seen as a betrayal of ideological principles and antithetical to future
electoral success. The typical portrayal of federal policymaking is one of excessive gridlock
and dysfunction. Yet it is in this context that two of the most significant federal education
laws, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) and the Every Student Succeeds Act
of 2015 (ESSA), were passed in an overwhelmingly bipartisan fashion (Henig, Houston,
and Lyon 2017; McGuinn 2006). Among ordinary citizens, there are notable differences
in public opinion on various education issues between Democrats and Republicans, but
these differences tend to be smaller than the partisan gaps on issues in other high-profile
policy domains (Shapiro et al. 2016). Although public feuds over education issues may be
rhetorically red in tooth and claw, federal education policy thus far has largely escaped the
pattern of sharp partisan polarization that has embroiled lawmaking in other arenas like
healthcare, gun control, reproductive rights, the environment, and immigration. Compared
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and Robert Erikson for their guidance and thoughtful feedback. This research is supported by the National
Academy of Education/Spencer Dissertation Fellowship and the Teachers College Research Dissertation
Fellowship. The code for this study can be found on the Open Science Framework at https://osf.io/pzvjh/.
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to many other issue areas, education may provide more fruitful territory for constructive
debate and bipartisan policymaking.
American education policy has a long history of relatively modest partisan gaps in
public opinion and frequent examples of bipartisan policymaking. In many instances, it
appears that other concerns have outweighed the imperatives of partisan conflict. This
study explores the conditions under which partisan polarization and de-polarization occur
with respect to public opinion on education issues. To guide this investigation, I pose three
general questions. First, does the provision of policy-relevant information cause partisans to
converge on the same position? Second, can signals from political elites with ideologically
moderate views move partisans closer together? And third, does direct experience with
public schools reduce the political abstraction with which one evaluates education policies?
I repurpose and extend 17 existing survey experiments to help answer the first two questions,
and I conduct a non-experimental data analysis to investigate the third.
Literature Review
Some scholars of American politics have suggested that education is a valence issue—a
topic about which most people share common values and beliefs even if they differ on
which political party would best advance those goals (Kahn and Kenney 1999). In this
review of the relevant literature, I offer evidence in support of the argument that there are
relatively minor differences in public opinion on many education issues between Democrats
and Republicans. A similar case could also be made for a number of other social and
economic group comparisons: the young and the old, the poor and the affluent, whites and
people of color, etc. (Page and Shapiro 1992; Berkman and Plutzer 2005: Shapiro et al.
2016). Although there are real and fiercely debated differences on matters of education
policy in the U.S., the fault lines of those disagreements tend not to fall neatly along our
major political, social, or economic divisions.
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Bipartisanship in Federal Education Policy
Debates on matters that involve kids and schools have always been heated and can often
be quite acrimonious. Battles over education policy inevitably invoke some of the great
fissures in American politics: economic inequality, racial injustice, the role of the federal
government, global competitiveness, and even national security. (One of the first federal
forays into education policy took the form of the National Defense Education Act of 1958,
which directed funds to state and local school systems to expand math, science, and foreign
language instruction in response to Sputnik and the growing apprehension that the Soviet
Union might win the space race.) Nevertheless, the primary federal K–12 education law,
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, was passed in 1965 and reauthorized in 1968,
1974, 1978, 1981, 1988, 1994, 2001, and 2015—the last two reauthorizations are better known
as NCLB and ESSA—with large bipartisan margins under both Democratic and Republican
presidents (McGuinn 2017).
This is not to suggest that we live in an age of widespread consensus on issues of
education. Rather, the disagreements that define contemporary education policy debates
tend to cut across rather than between the two major political parties. For example, in the
negotiations that ultimately resulted in the passage of NCLB, the business community on the
political right and a subset of the civil rights movement on the political left became unlikely
allies in the pursuit of an accountability system that would raise educational standards
across the board along with increased pressure to reduce long-standing racial achievement
gaps. On the other side, states’ rights activists who resisted the expansion of the federal role
in education found unexpected partners in the teachers unions, who held that the rise in
standardized testing stifled and undermined the teaching profession (Rhodes 2012). These
scrambled allegiances provided political cover for both Republicans and Democrats across
the political spectrum to support legislation that left their constituencies divided but not
wholly opposed (Henig, Houston, and Lyon 2017).
70
The Relative Absence of Polarization on Education Issues
In American politics more broadly, there is a near universal recognition that the two
major parties have become more polarized—meaning that Republicans have grown more
conservative while Democrats have grown more liberal, leaving little room for common
ground. There are two competing interpretations of this phenomenon: one represented by
Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope (2010) and the other by Abramowitz (2010). Both sides agree
that political elites have become more polarized. Analyses of roll call votes in Congress show
an unmistakable trend within each party towards greater ideological consistency among
members (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). Fiorina and his coauthors argue that this
trend is not reflected in the population at large. The appearance of widespread ideological
division among Americans is an illusion driven by the two-party system that effectively
requires Americans to vote for either Republican or Democratic politicians who have indeed
become more ideologically consistent and extreme. Most Americans, they contend, are
either generally moderate or simply apathetic about politics. Abramowitz, on the other
hand, argues that elected officials are merely following the lead of a growing and increasingly
ideological portion of the general public that wields disproportionate influence. According
to Abramowitz, it is this highly engaged, attentive, and informed subset of the public that
is leading the way towards a more polarized politics. The debate hinges on a matter of
emphasis: whether one is more concerned about current conditions (in which a majority of
Americans are indeed quite moderate and/or uninterested in politics) or ongoing trends
(in which polarization is growing over time). Longitudinal surveys indicate that party
identification is increasingly associated with political ideology. Compared to previous eras,
Democrats are more likely to identify as liberals, and Republicans are more likely to identify
as conservatives. Moreover, across an array of issues, the political attitudes of self-identified
partisans increasingly diverge in ideologically consistent ways (Bafumi and Shapiro 2009).
Education is not somehow exempt from this trend towards polarization, but recent
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work by Shapiro and his coauthors (2016) argues that the polarization of public opinion on
education issues is relatively muted in comparison to the partisan and ideological gaps found
in other arenas. Although rates of support for specific education policies diverge between
Democrats and Republicans, the differences are typically modest. In this section, I replicate
and extend some of the historical analyses by Shapiro et al. in order to situate the degree of
polarization on education issues over time and among other domestic policy domains.
One of the longest running surveys of social attitudes, the General Social Survey
(GSS) conducted by NORC at the University of Chicago, has asked a series of questions
on government spending and policy preferences across an array of domestic and foreign
issues on a roughly biennial basis since 1973. Figure 3.1 presents the separate trend
lines of support for increased spending among self-identified Democrats and self-identified
Republicans (including those that say they lean towards one party or another1) on twelve
different issues. For each question, the survey administrator asks the respondent if he or she
thinks we are “spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on .” Each
graph in Figure 3.1 displays the proportion of Democrats suggesting that we spend too little
on a given issue and the proportion of Republicans who express the same position. The
graphs also display the average gap in support for increased spending on each issue between
the two parties over all available years as well as the average gap between the two parties
from 1994 onwards (roughly the midpoint in the time series and the year of the “Republican
Revolution” in which the GOP took control of the U.S. House of Representatives for the
first time in 40 years).
On average, there has been a 13 percentage point gap in support for increased spending
on “improving the nation’s education system” between Democrats and Republicans. The
size of this gap falls squarely in the middle of the range of similarly constructed gaps on
other issues. The average partisan gap on education spending is larger than the gaps on
1 I also constructed similar graphs that exclude so-called partisan “leaners.” The results were substantively
equivalent. As is typical, all analyses in this study incorporate “leaners” into party identifications (Keith
et al. 1992).
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spending on foreign aid, the space exploration program, halting the rising crime rate,2 dealing
with drug addiction, and the military. On the other hand, the education spending gap is
smaller than the gaps on social security, solving the problems of big cities, welfare, the
environment, improving and protecting the nation’s health, and improving the condition
of blacks. Moreover, the partisan gaps on most issues have grown considerably since the
mid-90’s, while the size of the education gap has remained constant. Over the last two
decades, the partisan gaps on the military, improving and protecting the nation’s health, the
environment, and improving the condition of blacks have grown to roughly twice the size of
the partisan gap on education. Given the somewhat arbitrary selection of issues explored by
the GSS and the idiosyncratic effects of question wording, it would be unwise to imbue this
simple analysis with undue precision. However, the substantive conclusion that one ought to
draw from these relationships is fairly straightforward: a partisan gap exists on the question
of education spending, but this gap is noticeably smaller and more resistant to contemporary
polarizing trends than the analogous gaps on many other high-profile issues.
Figure 3.2 shifts from spending preferences to policy preferences, displaying trend lines
of support for twelve social policies among Democrats and Republicans. The GSS asks two
questions about education-specific policy preferences: one on sex education in public schools
and another on school prayer. Perhaps surprisingly, the average partisan gaps on these two
questions about sex, religion, and schools are considerably smaller than the gaps found on
other hot-button issues. On average, support for teaching sex education and support for
prohibiting bible prayer in public schools diverge by only six percentage points between
Democrats and Republicans. For comparison purposes, the average gap on support for
access to abortion for any reason is 11 percentage points, and the average gap on support
for the death penalty for murder is 17 percentage points. The gaps on sex education and
bible prayer have expanded slightly over the past two decades (from 1994 to 2016, they have
2 The leading nature of this question and its incorrect assertion that the crime rate has been consistently
rising since 1973 probably results in a skewed sense of consensus. There is almost certainly a greater
partisan divide on issues of criminal justice than portrayed here.
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Figure 3.1: Polarization and Spending Preferences
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Figure 3.2: Polarization and Policy Preferences
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grown to eight and ten percentage points, respectively); however, the differences between the
two parties on these education issues during this time period remain modest in comparison
to other policy domains.
Many of the more recent education policy debates also exhibit relatively moderate
levels of party polarization (Peterson, Henderson, and West 2014; Shapiro et al. 2016).
Since 2007, the partisan gaps on graduation tests, grade promotion tests, universal private
school tuition vouchers, merit-based pay for teachers, and merit-based teacher tenure have all
been about five percentage points or less—although slightly larger gaps can be observed on
the Common Core State Standards, teacher salaries, teachers unions, means-tested private
school tuition vouchers, and, in some years, charter schools. Moreover, there are only small
differences between partisans on beliefs about factual matters pertaining to education policy.
Democrats’ and Republicans’ estimates of average districtwide per pupil expenditures and
average statewide teacher salaries diverge by about $1000 each. Partisans differ by a few
percentage points in their rates of correct responses to questions about charter schools’
abilities to hold religious services or charge tuition (neither are permitted). The scenario
described in this section, in which many Democrats and Republicans share common attitudes
and beliefs about issues of education, is potentially conducive to productive debate and
mutually acceptable political compromise. In the remainder of the paper, I explore some of
the conditions under which partisan consensus is more and less likely on matters of public
schooling.
Mechanisms for Polarization and De-Polarization
Political scientists have proposed a number of potential mechanisms that could be driving
public opinion polarization over the last few decades. These theories include the long-term
electoral decline of conservative Democrats in the South and liberal Republicans in the
Northeast, more accurate self-sorting of individuals into the political party that aligns with
their ideological preferences, the growth of income inequality, the rise of a highly fragmented
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media market, and the decline of major international threats (Abramowitz and Saunders
1998; Bafumi and Parent 2012; Levendusky 2009; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006;
Prior 2013). However, the presence of different levels of polarization across issues suggests
that there are also micro-level mechanisms at work. If Americans are somewhat less polarized
on education than on other issues, then presumably there are other pathways for polarization
and de-polarization that vary by issue. In this study, I explore whether the degree of partisan
polarization on education is affected by the level of subjects’ policy-relevant knowledge, the
presence of ideologically moderate signals from political elites, and the extent to which
subjects have direct experience with public schools.
Policy Information
There is some evidence generated by politically-oriented psychologists and psychology-
minded political scientists that higher levels of policy-relevant knowledge can increase
polarization between Democrats and Republicans. These researchers suggest that partisans
tend to learn new information about policies and politics in politically charged ways. In
their classic text, The American Voter, Campbell and his coauthors (1960, 133) suggest that
“identification with a party raises a perceptual screen through which the individual tends
to see what is favorable to his partisan orientation. The stronger the party bond, the more
exaggerated the process of selection and perceptual distortion will be.” Years later, Zaller
(1992, 241) echoes this sentiment, arguing that politically engaged individuals develop a
form of “partisan resistance” that allows them to filter out evidence that contrasts with
their prior ideological commitments, generating two distinct political camps that diverge in
response to new information. In this section, I consider some of the academic literature on
biased and unbiased political information processing and their effects on polarization.
Lord, Ross, and Lepper’s (1979) canonical study on biased information assimilation
describes a demonstration wherein subjects with differing views on the deterrent effects of
the death penalty are provided evidence both for and against deterrence. Subjects tend to
77
rate evidence that aligns with their pre-existing positions as more rigorous and convincing,
and they tend to apply heightened scrutiny to evidence that contradicts their prior beliefs.
After assessing the available evidence, the opposing camps’ views on the deterrent effects
of the death penalty diverge even further. Rather than producing consensus, exposure
to a mixed body of evidence on a topic actually increases polarization. Later laboratory
experiments replicate this general finding: subjects with differing prior beliefs on a given
topic can become more entrenched in their views upon being exposed to new information on
that topic, producing even more severe polarization (Taber, Cann, and Kucsova 2009; Taber
and Lodge 2006). Even when partisan public opinion moves in the same direction, Democrats
and Republicans tend to incorporate new information into their belief systems at different
rates, depending on the extent to which it conforms with their political predispositions (Jerit
and Barabas 2012).
In contrast to the laboratory experiments that document the polarizing effects of policy-
relevant information, longitudinal public opinion survey data from the mid-20th century often
reveal roughly parallel partisan responses to events and new information. Evaluations of the
president, party competence, and the strength of the economy typically track changes in
economic conditions, and these evaluations tend to shift in the same direction for both
Democrats and Republicans (Gerber and Green 1999; Green, Schickler, and Palmquist
2002). However, this pattern of seemingly unbiased information processing observable in
longitudinal surveys may be changing in the context of our increasingly polarized politics.
In their analysis of aggregate public opinion trends from the 1940’s to the 1980’s, Page and
Shapiro (1992) document parallel movement among most social and economic groups (e.g.,
although whites and blacks may differ on average with respect to many policies, support for
those policies tends to rise and fall for both groups at the same time). In the last few decades,
however, there now appears to be one exception to these “parallel publics:” Democrats and
Republicans (Shapiro and Bloch-Elkon 2006). On many issues, partisan opinion has begun
to diverge over time, indicating differential partisan responses to the ongoing flow of events
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and information.
The question here is whether the field of education is somehow different. Are individuals
able to learn new policy-relevant information about public schooling without triggering
partisan reactions? Reckhow, Grossman, and Evans (2015) conduct a series of survey
experiments in which they provide additional information about Michigan charter schools
to subsets of their subject pool. They note that self-identified liberals and conservatives
respond in similar ways to information about some charters’ for-profit status and information
about universities’ roles as a charter authorizers. On the other hand, they also note that
conservatives are even more likely to support charter schools upon learning about charters’
tendency to hire nonunion teachers, thereby increasing polarization on the issue (although
that piece of information may be unusually likely to evoke ideological considerations).
Constructive political debate requires a shared foundation of facts as well as the possibility
of mutual learning. In this study, I am interested in whether partisan opinion on education
issues diverges in response to new information—as it does on many other issues—or if better
informed partisans are more likely to converge towards the same position.
Ideologically Moderate Elite Signaling
Political scientists have long recognized the effects of political cues and elite signals on
individuals’ attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Downs 1957; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Popkin
1991). Traditional scholarship typically holds up heuristics and cue-giving as boons to
democracy, making democratic responsiveness possible even in the absence of a highly active
and informed citizenry. However, more recent scholars have expressed concern over the extent
to which citizens’ positions on questions of government policy are being driven primarily by
partisan cues and political endorsements rather than by information on the features and
potential consequences of the policies themselves. In a series of lab experiments, Cohen
(2003) demonstrates that, in the absence of an endorsement by the Democratic or Republican
party, subjects tend to evaluate a policy based on its content and their personal ideological
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beliefs; however, when provided a partisan endorsement for or against the policy, subjects
tend to forgo an equivalent evaluation and merely adopt the views of their party. The power
of such cues may be even more severe in highly polarized contexts. Druckman, Peterman,
and Slothuus (2013) randomly assign party endorsements on two contested issues (drilling for
oil and gas and immigration status for undocumented children brought to the U.S. in their
youth) as well as statements about whether the parties are starkly split on these issues or not.
They find that the effects of party endorsements are larger when the debates are described
as more polarized. On the other hand, there may be limits to the extent to which party
cues can influence individuals’ policy preferences. Bullock (2011) argues that the provision
of information that signals the ideological content of a policy can have a larger effect on
attitudes towards that policy than the provision of the two major parties’ positions.
These studies suggest that party cues can be a powerful and potentially misleading
source of information about the merits of specific policies. The implication here is that elite
signals often serve to reinforce ideological dogmatism and partisan division at the expense
of more substantive and pragmatic evaluations of policies. But what if, as in the case of
education policy, party lines are less rigid and elite actors occasionally adopt positions at
odds with their political bases? The internal divisions within parties over education policy—
between the business community and states’ rights activists on the right and between civil
rights leaders and teachers unions on the left—often result in prominent partisans taking
positions that are ideologically atypical, such as George W. Bush’s embrace of a strong federal
role in education or Barack Obama’s support for charter schools and merit-based teacher
salaries (Rhodes 2012). For partisans following the policy cues of educational moderates
such as Bush and Obama, these elite signals may produce less calcified party lines on the
issues.
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Direct Experience with Public Schools
The third and final theoretical mechanism for polarization/de-polarization presented here
has received less extensive treatment in the political science literature. I hypothesize that
greater exposure to a specific public service may reduce the level of political abstraction
that individuals apply when considering that service. The comparative politics literature
provides some correlational evidence that political polarization is negatively related to the
size of government in democratic countries: countries that provide more resources, goods,
and services tend to experience less polarized public opinion (Lindqvist and O¨stling 2010).
However, there is no existing research that explicitly studies the effects of experience with
government services on polarization.
In the field of education, there is evidence that individuals with more experience
with the public schools tend to have different attitudes about them. These differences
could plausibly influence the degree of partisan polarization on education issues. The Phi
Delta Kappa/Gallup Poll of the Public’s Attitudes Towards the Public Schools reliably
shows that satisfaction with public education increases along with familiarity with the
schools themselves. Parents tend to be far more enthusiastic than the general public about
the quality of local schools, and parents tend to grade their own children’s schools more
generously still (Bali 2016; Berkman and Plutzer 2005; Bushaw and Lopez 2011; Cannon
and Barham 1993; Elam 1995). Moreover, greater familiarity not only affects perceptions of
school quality, it also appears to be linked to a stronger relationship between perceived quality
and official measures of school performance. Parents of school-aged children are considerably
more likely than their counterparts with less direct exposure to public education to hold
opinions of their local schools that reflect recent school accountability grades (Chingos,
Henderson, and West 2012). It is possible that viewing schools as concrete entities with
which one has direct experience—as opposed to institutional abstractions—engenders a less
politically charged approach to education issues.
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Methodology
This study explores the effects of 1) the provision of policy information, 2) the provision of
ideologically moderate elite signals, and 3) direct experience with public schools on the level
of political polarization on education issues.
The proposed link between policy-relevant information and polarization lends itself
to a straightforward empirical test: a survey experiment in which policy information is
randomly assigned prior to the polling of attitudes on education issues. This approach
would allow the researcher to identify whether or not there are heterogeneous effects of
such information on policy preferences by party identification, revealing its polarizing or
de-polarizing consequences.
To test whether or not partisans converge on similar positions after being exposed to
ideologically moderate elite signals, one could employ another survey experiment in which
the provision of moderate policy endorsements by prominent politicians would be randomly
assigned prior to the measurement of individuals’ education policy preferences. Much like
the exploration of policy information and polarization described above, the researcher would
again be interested to observe whether or not these elite signals produce heterogeneous
treatment effects that would attenuate or exacerbate the partisan gap on a given issue.
With respect to the proposed link between direct experience with public schools and
polarization on education issues, there is no simple and inexpensive survey experiment that
is able to randomly assign exposure to schools. However, there is a great deal of observable
variation in such exposure among Americans. As a first step, a researcher could identify
a correlational link between direct experience with public schooling and attitudes towards
education issues. The analytic approach would be quite similar to the experiments sketched
above, even if the findings would not authoritatively capture a causal relationship. The
researcher would be primarily interested in the interaction between party identification and
exposure to schooling. The question is whether the relationships between direct experience
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with public schools and public opinion on a set of education issues vary by party, resulting in
smaller partisan gaps on those issues among individuals with greater exposure to the public
school system.
Research Questions
1. Are better informed partisans more likely to converge towards the same position on
education issues?
2. Can signals from political elites with ideologically moderate views move partisans closer
together on education issues?
3. Does direct experience with public schools reduce political polarization on education
issues?
Data Sources
Using data from the Education Next-Harvard University Program on Education Policy
and Governance Survey, a nationally representative poll of education policy preferences
conducted annually by Knowledge Networks, I repurpose and extend 17 existing survey
experiments to estimate the effects of policy information and ideologically moderate elite
signals on polarization. I conduct a non-experimental analysis on the same survey data to
determine whether or not there is a link between direct experience with public schools and
polarization.
To explore the extent to which policy information affects polarization on education
issues, I reanalyze data from survey experiments administered in 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012,
2013, and 2014 (the 2010 experiment employs a different question wording) in which
additional information on education spending and teacher salaries are provided to a randomly
selected subset of the survey pool alongside questions about these issues. With respect
to education spending, one half of the subject pool receives current estimates of average
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districtwide per pupil expenditures. All subjects are asked, “Do you think that government
funding for public schools in your district should increase, decrease, or stay about the same?”
I dichotomize responses such that 1 equals “increase” or “greatly increase” (0 otherwise). For
teacher salaries, one half of the subject pool receives current estimates of average statewide
teacher salaries. All subjects are asked, “Do you think that teacher salaries in your state
should increase, decrease, or stay about the same?” I dichotomize responses such that 1
equals “increase” or “greatly increase” (0 otherwise).
To explore the extent to which the provision of ideologically moderate elite signals
affects polarization on education issues, I reanalyze data from survey experiments adminis-
tered in 2009 and 2010 in which Barack Obama’s positions on charter schools, merit-based
teacher pay, school accountability, and testing are provided to a randomly selected subset
of the survey pool alongside questions about these issues. With respect to charter schools,
one-third of the subject pool receives Obama’s position (“President Barack Obama has ex-
pressed support for charter schools.”) while another third of the subject pool does not. The
remaining third receives a different treatment and is excluded from this analysis.3 All sub-
jects are asked, “Many states permit the formation of charter schools, which are publicly
funded but are not managed by the local school board. These schools are expected to meet
promised objectives, but are exempt from many state regulations. Do you support or oppose
the formation of charter schools?” I dichotomize responses such that 1 equals “somewhat
support” or “completely support” (0 otherwise). For merit-based teacher pay, one-third of
the subject pool receives Obama’s position (“President Barack Obama has expressed sup-
port for the policy of basing teachers’ salaries, in part, on their students’ academic progress
on tests.”) while another third of the subject pool does not. The remaining third receives
a different treatment and is excluded from this analysis.4 All subjects are asked, “Do you
favor or oppose basing a teacher’s salary, in part, on his or her students’ academic progress
3 These subjects receive a message about research on the policy’s effects on student achievement.
4 See previous footnote.
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on state tests?” I dichotomize responses such that 1 equals “somewhat favor” or “completely
favor” (0 otherwise). For school accountability, one half of the subject pool receives Obama’s
position (“As you may know, this year Congress is expected to take action on the federal
school accountability law. President Barack Obama has proposed to maintain the current
requirement that all students be tested in math and reading each year in grades 3–8 and
once in high school.”). All subjects are asked, “Do you support or oppose this proposal?”
I dichotomize responses such that 1 equals “somewhat support” or “completely support”
(0 otherwise). For testing, one half of the subject pool receives Obama’s position (“Presi-
dent Obama has proposed that states be required to toughen the standards and tests used
to evaluate student performance.”) All subjects are asked, “Do you support or oppose this
proposal?” I dichotomize responses such that 1 equals “somewhat support” or “completely
support” (0 otherwise).
The Education Next poll does not contain a survey experiment that randomly assigns
exposure to the public school system (nor is such an experiment easily conceivable). To
tackle the question of whether or not the relationship between public school exposure and
education policy preferences varies by party identification, I pool the survey responses from
2008 to 2014 and conduct an analysis on all available data. As a proxy for direct experience
with the public schools, I use the presence or absence of children in the house (coded 1 if
there was a child under the age of 18 in the household and 0 otherwise). For dependent
variables, I use the original, unmodified versions of the education spending, charter schools,
vouchers, teacher salaries, and merit-based pay questions as they appear in the various survey
administrations. This allows me to employ identical question wording throughout for each
survey question. The sample size for each sub-analysis varies according the number of years
in which the question was asked and the size of the subset of the survey pool that receives
the consistent version of the question. For each education policy preference question, I
dichotomize answers as described in the previous two paragraphs.
A small number of subjects did not answer some of the questions on education policy
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preferences. For each case, I code their response as “Do Not Support” or “Do Not Favor.”
This allows me to retain my focus on the various probabilities of support for a range of
education issues among Democrats and Republicans while maintaining the integrity of the
original random assignments that lend the experiments their internal validity.
The Education Next poll also collects extensive demographic information on its re-
spondents. For my analyses, I use measures of subjects’ age, educational attainment,
race/ethnicity, gender, income, U.S. Census region, the number of children under the age of
18 in the household, political ideology (Conservative, Liberal, or Moderate/Undecided/Other),
and party identification (Republican, Democrat, or Independent/Undecided/Other). There
are only a few instances of missing data for these demographic characteristics. Some respon-
dents did not answer the political ideology or party identification questions. For political
ideology, I code missing values as Moderate/Undecided/Other. For party identification, I
code missing values as Independent/Undecided/Other. This study is interested in the dif-
ferences between those who actively identify as Democrats and Republicans. Subjects with
missing political identity data can be recoded as “Other” without affecting the comparison
of interest. Moreover, by recoding these subjects into the existing “Other” category rather
than creating a new “Missing” category, I am able to employ a simpler model specification.
Analytic Approach
The analytic approach for each test of the three polarization mechanisms proceeds in the
same fashion. I fit a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression equations:
Yi = β0 + β1Ti + β2Repi + β3Otheri + β4Ti×Repi + β5Ti×Otheri + β′6Xi + i, (3.1)
where Y is the outcome (each education policy preference coded as 0 or 1); T is the treatment
(the provision of policy information, the provision of Obama’s position, or the presence
of children under the age of 18 in the household); Rep is an indicator for Republican
or Republican “leaner;” Other is an indicator for Independent/Undecided/Other (leaving
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Democrats and Democrat “leaners” as the comparison group); X is a vector of covariates
for age, educational attainment, race/ethnicity, gender, income, U.S. Census region, political
ideology, and survey year (when data are pooled from multiple survey administrations), and
 is the error term for individual i.
In each model, the coefficients of interest are the same. For a treatment to be associated
with a decrease in the average partisan gap on a given issue, one would expect to see
substantively and statistically significant values with opposite signs for β2 and β4. An
exception applies when β4 is larger in absolute value than β2. In this case, the treatment
would be associated with an increase in the average partisan gap on a given issue.
Findings
Policy Information
Table 3.1 displays the results of 12 survey experiments conducted between 2008 and
2014 on the effects of the provision of average districtwide per pupil expenditures and
average statewide teacher salaries on support for increased education spending and increased
teacher salaries, respectively. I focus here on the extent to which there is treatment effect
heterogeneity among Democrats and Republicans. The results of the experiments are
remarkably consistent. Among Democrats, there is a moderately large negative effect of
providing current spending levels on support for increased education spending in general
and teacher salaries in particular. Depending on the year, the effect ranges from a nine
to 24 percentage point decrease in the probability of supporting more spending. There is a
slightly smaller negative effect of the same information among Republicans. These effect size
differences between parties tend to be minor (between one and nine percentage points), and
they are only statistically significant in a few cases (Models 13–14 and 19–22). However, the
pattern is quite uniform across nearly every experiment. There are only two exceptions to
the rule—teacher salaries in 2009 and 2011—in which the effect size is essentially identical for
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Table 3.1: The Effect of Policy Information on Polarization
2008 2009
More Spending Teacher Salaries More Spending Teacher Salaries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Information -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.12 -0.11 -0.12 -0.13
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Republican -0.23 -0.12 -0.15 -0.07 -0.22 -0.14 -0.10 -0.04
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Info × Republican 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3,228 3,228 3,234 3,234 3,251 3,251 3,251 3,251
2011 2012
More Spending Teacher Salaries More Spending Teacher Salaries
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Information -0.17 -0.17 -0.09 -0.09 -0.21 -0.21 -0.24 -0.24
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Republican -0.27 -0.22 -0.22 -0.17 -0.22 -0.16 -0.18 -0.13
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Info × Republican 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.07
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2,632 2,632 2,632 2,632 1,519 1,519 2,993 2,993
2013 2014
More Spending Teacher Salaries More Spending Teacher Salaries
(17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
Information -0.17 -0.18 -0.23 -0.23 -0.21 -0.22 -0.23 -0.23
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Republican -0.22 -0.15 -0.20 -0.17 -0.29 -0.19 -0.19 -0.12
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Info × Republican 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5,569 5,569 5,569 5,569 3,491 3,491 5,266 5,266
Notes: Values are linear probability model coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; Republican
compared to Democrat (Independent/Undecided/Other/NA not shown); covariates include age,
educational attainment, race, gender, income, U.S. Census region, children in household, and political
ideology; party identification variables contain individuals who say they lean towards one party.
Source: Education Next Survey, Program on Education Policy and Governance, Harvard University
Democrats and Republicans. In all other cases, Democrats respond a little more forcefully
to the information than their Republican peers. This consistency across many experiments
suggests a small but persistent difference in the way Democrats and Republicans respond
to the provision of these pieces of information. The magnitudes of the treatment effects
tend to increase in the later experiments, but the changes are largely limited to Democrats.
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This results in greater convergence in public opinion in the treatment groups over time. The
partisan gaps in the control groups stay fairly constant from year to year.
In order to increase the statistical power available to identify this treatment effect
heterogeneity, I pool the data from all six years and analyze them as if they were two
large experiments. Table 3.2 displays the results. Overall, Republicans are less likely to
support increased education spending than their peers on the other side of the political
spectrum. Among Democrats, there is a moderately large negative effect of the provision of
education spending data on education spending preferences: roughly a 20 percentage point
decline in the probability of supporting increased expenditures. The negative effect is about
five percentage points smaller for Republicans. This suggests that the provision of policy-
relevant information on education spending can indeed reduce the partisan gap in support
for related policies (although it is possible that this pattern is unique to information about
spending). These findings provide tentative evidence in favor of the hypothesis that better
informed partisans are likely to be less polarized on some education issues.
This is not the pattern of responses we would expect from the perspective of the biased
information processing literature. In general, the provision of education spending data tends
to induce more conservative attitudes towards education spending in general and teacher
Table 3.2: The Effect of Policy Information on Polarization (All Years)
More Spending Teacher Salaries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Information -0.17 -0.17 -0.19 -0.19
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Republican -0.24 -0.16 -0.18 -0.12
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Info × Republican 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Covariates Yes Yes
N 19,690 19,690 22,945 22,945
Notes: Values are linear probability model coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; Republican
compared to Democrat (Independent/Undecided/Other/NA not shown); covariates include age,
educational attainment, race, gender, income, U.S. Census region, children in household, and political
ideology; party identification variables contain individuals who say they lean towards one party; all
models hold survey year constant. Source: Education Next Survey, Program on Education Policy and
Governance, Harvard University
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salaries in particular. If reactions were shaped primarily by party identification, then we
would expect to see smaller effects for Democrats, who presumably would be more likely to
A) ignore the spending data, B) subject it to heightened scrutiny, or C) simply conclude that
current spending levels are still inadequate. Instead, Democrats make a larger correction in
response to the spending data, resulting in an overall convergence in opinion. Partisans seem
to be responding to the information itself and not to the ways in which that information
would facilitate or inhibit partisan goals. What is not clear is whether this dynamic is
attributable to the type of information provided or to the nature of the policy domain.
Additional research is necessary to explore whether similar patterns emerge in response to
different kinds of education information and in response to spending data in other areas like
healthcare, environmental protection, and criminal justice.
Ideologically Moderate Elite Signaling
Table 3.3 displays the results of five survey experiments conducted in 2009 and 2010 on
the effects of the provision of an ideologically moderate policy endorsement from former
President Barack Obama on a range of education policies. There is a sharp distinction
between the results of the 2009 experiments and the 2010 experiments. In 2009, there is a
modest positive effect of Obama’s endorsement of charter schools on Democrats’ support for
charters (about a nine percentage point increase in the probability of support). Republicans,
on the other hand, remain unmoved by Obama’s endorsement. As a result, the partisan gap
on the issue is essentially reduced to zero. A similar pattern appears in the 2009 experiment
on merit-based teacher pay, but the treatment effect heterogeneity fails to meet the threshold
of statistical significance.
In 2010, however, a dramatically different result occurs. Democrats have a predictable
response to Obama’s endorsements: they become somewhat more supportive of those
policies. Republicans, however, respond negatively to Obama’s endorsements, despite the
fact that his positions are more consistent with the modal Republican stance. In the
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Table 3.3: The Effect of Ideologically Moderate Elite Signals on Polarization
2009
Charter Schools Merit Pay
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Elite Signal 0.09 0.09 0.16 0.16
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Republican 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.03
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Signal × Republican -0.09 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Covariates Yes Yes
N 2,164 2,164 2,142 2,142
2010
Accountability Rigorous Testing Merit Pay
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Elite Signal 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.13 0.05 0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Republican -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Signal × Republican -0.14 -0.15 -0.16 -0.16 -0.14 -0.13
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes
N 2,776 2,776 2,776 2,776 2,776 2,776
Notes: Values are linear probability model coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; Republican
compared to Democrat (Independent/Undecided/Other/NA not shown); covariates include age,
educational attainment, race, gender, income, U.S. Census region, children in household, and political
ideology; party identification variables contain individuals who say they lean towards one party.
Source: Education Next Survey, Program on Education Policy and Governance, Harvard University
treatment group, the probability of Democrats supporting the policies that Obama endorses
increases by between five and 14 percentage points, but the probability of Republicans
supporting those same policies decreases by between two and nine percentage points. By
contrast, in the control groups, Democrats and Republicans only diverge by three percentage
points or less. In all three 2010 experiments, the provision of an ideologically moderate elite
signal actually serves to increase polarization.
As a result, a consistent interpretation of the data remains elusive. It may be the case
that, in a less heated political context, such signals can have de-polarizing consequences.
However, extreme resistance to the politician providing the signal may alter the underlying
dynamic. Alternatively, perhaps 2009 is the aberrant case, captured at the tail end of a
president’s so-called honeymoon period at the beginning of the first term. In more typical
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political contexts, the negative partisanship apparent in 2010 may be the norm. A more
general understanding of the effects of ideologically moderate opinion leadership on education
issues requires a broader set of experiments employing the positions of a variety of Democrats
and Republicans at different times.
Direct Experience with Public Schools
Table 3.4 displays the results of a series of regressions of education policy preferences on
the presence of children under the age of 18 in the household (a proxy for exposure to the
public school system). Compared to their peers without kids at home, individuals with
children in the household have a smaller partisan gap in support for increased education
spending. Both Democrats and Republicans with children at home are more likely to support
increased spending than their childfree co-partisans, but the Republican position shifts more,
reducing the Democrat-Republican gap by about eight percentage points. Individuals with
children in the household also have a smaller partisan gap on support for charter schools.
Democrats with children at home are slightly more likely to support charters than their
childfree co-partisans, while Republicans with children at home are slightly less likely to
Table 3.4: The Link Between Children in the Household and Polarization
2008–2014 2008–2014 2008–2011 2008–2010 ‘08–‘11, ‘13
More Spending Charter Schools Vouchers Teacher Salaries Merit Pay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Child 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Republican -0.27 -0.18 0.15 0.13 -0.04 0.01 -0.13 -0.07 0.07 0.06
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Child × Rep 0.08 0.08 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 10,847 10,847 17,228 17,228 3,801 3,801 4,554 4,554 12,239 12,239
Notes: Values are linear probability model coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; Republican
compared to Democrat (Independent/Undecided/Other/NA not shown); covariates include age,
educational attainment, race, gender, income, U.S. Census region, and political ideology; party
identification variables contain individuals who say they lean towards one party; all models hold survey
year constant. Source: Education Next Survey, Program on Education Policy and Governance, Harvard
University
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support charters than their childfree co-partisans, reducing the Democrat-Republican gap
by about five percentage points. The partisan gaps on vouchers, teacher salaries, and merit-
based teacher pay do not appear to vary by the presence of children in the household.
These findings are robust to the inclusion of a large range of covariates, such as age,
educational attainment, race, gender, income, U.S. Census region, and political ideology.
However, the presence of children in the household is not random, and the possibility of
selection bias remains. It is reasonable to assume that individuals who currently have children
in their house may have systematically different attitudes towards issues of education than
those whose households do not contain or no longer contain children—for reasons unrelated
to the differential exposure to public schools induced by the presence or absence of kids. Most
of these individuals are parents, and the kinds of individuals who choose to have children
may be a self-selecting group with somewhat different education policy preferences. These
analyses, therefore, should not be read as definitive evidence in favor of the argument that
greater direct experience with the public schools reduces political polarization. Rather this
should be viewed as tentative evidence that invites future investigations into the issue.
Conclusions
The partisan gaps on issues of education policy tend to be less dramatic than analogous
gaps in other high-profile policy domains like healthcare, environmental issues, welfare,
reproductive rights, gun control, drug legalization, and criminal justice. In our highly
polarized era, this could make education policy a uniquely appealing area for political
actors to engage in constructive debate and bipartisan policymaking. This study explores
the conditions under which partisan polarization and de-polarization occur with respect to
public opinion on education issues. I investigate the extent to which 1) the provision of
policy-relevant information, 2) the provision of ideologically moderate signals from political
elites, and 3) direct experience with public schools cause partisans to converge on the same
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position. I find consistent evidence that the provision of education spending information
has de-polarizing consequences, but the effects of ideologically moderate elite signals on
polarization vary by year. I also find tentative evidence in favor of a link between direct
experience with public schools and reduced polarization on education issues.
To test the effects of policy-relevant information on polarization, I reanalyze 12 survey
experiments that randomly assign information on current education spending levels before
polling respondents on their attitudes towards increased education spending in general and
increased spending on teacher salaries in particular. Although the differences in effect
sizes by party identification are small, I find consistent evidence that the provision of
spending data reduces the partisan gap on education spending questions. While this evidence
for treatment effect heterogeneity only occasionally meets the conventional threshold for
statistical significance, the pattern is remarkably consistent across a dozen essentially
identical experiments—arguably a better indicator of validity. These results are somewhat
surprising from the perspective of the literature on biased information processing. In this
case, both Democrats and Republicans shift towards a more conventionally conservative
position, with Democrats exhibiting a larger overall change. Partisans’ reactions to the
provision of education spending data do not appear to be shaped by the expectations of
their party affiliations.
To test the effects of ideologically moderate elite signals on polarization, I reanalyze
five survey experiments that randomly assign former President Obama’s positions on a range
of education issues before polling respondents on their attitudes towards those issues. The
results of the experiments conducted in 2009 are considerably different from the results of
the experiments conducted in 2010. In 2009, the provision of Obama’s position tends to shift
Democrats towards the conventionally Republican position while Republicans are generally
unmoved, effectively reducing or even eliminating the partisan gaps. In these cases, partisans
react in politically predictable ways, but the ideologically atypical content of the elite signal
has de-polarizing consequences. In 2010, however, Republicans respond quite negatively to
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Obama’s positions, increasing polarization on those issues. Obama’s 2010 endorsements
appear to ignite Republicans’ partisan attachments, adding political heat to previously
lukewarm debates. The results of these analyses do not provide consistent evidence on
the effects of ideologically moderate elite signals. Additional research is necessary in order
to explore the effects of policy endorsements from a broader range of figures from across the
political spectrum.
Finally, to understand the link between direct experience with public schools and
polarization, I conduct a non-experimental analysis that investigates the relationships
between the presence of children in the household (a proxy for direct experience) and a
range of education policy preferences as they vary by party identification. I find evidence
that partisans with children at home are less divided on education spending and charter
schools. However, with the current analysis, it is not possible to argue definitively that
these instances of partisan convergence are directly caused by different levels of experience
with public schools. Indeed, there may be another factor, such as parental status itself, that
drives this heterogeneity. Although the underlying proposition—the link between experience
with public schools and polarization—may resist straightforward experimentation, future
researchers could consider a number of other approaches that address this issue indirectly.
For example, a researcher might conduct a survey experiment in which a random subset of
the subject pool is primed to remember concrete details about their own or their children’s
schooling (features of the building, teachers’ names, etc.), thereby calling the memories of
those experiences to mind. Alternatively, with the right data, a quasi-experimental approach
could be possible. In some school districts, there are strict rules regarding birthdays and
matriculation in the younger grades. One could imagine a regression discontinuity design
based on birthdays and school entry that explores the effects of years of schooling (or years
of parenting a child in school) on education policy preferences and polarization.
Each of these tests generate as many (or more) questions as answers. However,
the preliminary conclusions of this study are fairly straightforward, pending replication in
95
other contexts. With respect to their political attitudes on issues of education, partisans
are capable of responding to some pieces of policy-relevant information in ways that are
unconditioned by their partisan identities, potentially facilitating more open and productive
debate. A similar dynamic may follow the information accrued and the experiences gleaned
from greater direct experience with public schools. However, the power of party affiliations
can reemerge if prominent political elites take an explicit position in an ongoing debate.
In some cases, partisans appear to remobilize in accordance with or in opposition to that
position. If political actors and ordinary citizens are interested in bipartisan solutions to
education issues, the path forward may lie in the conversations and decisions that occur
at less politically elevated levels, in which the blessings and curses of famously polarizing
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Learning About Schooling: Survey Instruments
Survey 1
Q1.1 We are conducting an academic study about public schools in the United States. We
are looking for your opinions. This survey will take about 5-7 minutes to complete. At the
end of the session, you will receive a code to enter on Mechanical Turk to be paid $0.50.
This study contains two short follow-up surveys. Only take this survey if you are also willing
to take a follow-up survey tomorrow and another follow-up survey in 10 days.
The follow-up surveys will only take about 2-3 minutes to complete and will pay $1.00 each.
Eligibility: You must be 18 years or older and a resident of the United States to be eligible
to take these surveys.
Q1.2 The informed consent form for this study is displayed below. Please click the button
on the bottom of the page to confirm that you agree to participate in this study.
INFORMED CONSENT
Study Title: State Education Systems in the United States
Principal Investigator: David M. Houston
Institution: Teachers College, Columbia University
Contact: david.houston@tc.columbia.edu
INTRODUCTION
You are being invited to participate in this research study called “State Education Systems
in the United States.” You may qualify to take part in this research study if you are 18 years
or older and if you are a resident of the United States. In total, it will take about 10-15
minutes of your time to complete.
WHY IS THIS STUDY BEING DONE?
This study is being done to determine how the provision of relevant data affects political
attitudes about education.
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WHAT WILL I BE ASKED TO DO IF I AGREE TO TAKE PART IN THIS STUDY?
If you decide to participate, you will complete a short online survey and two follow-up sur-
veys. Upon completing each part of the survey, you will receive a code to enter on Mechanical
Turk. You will receive $0.50 for the completion of the initial survey. You will receive $1.00
for completing each successive follow-up survey. Participation in this study is completely
voluntary.
WHAT POSSIBLE RISKS OR DISCOMFORTS CAN I EXPECT FROM TAKING PART
IN THIS STUDY?
This is a minimal risk study, which means the harms or discomforts that you may experience
are not greater than you would ordinarily encounter in daily life while taking informational
surveys. However, you do not have to answer any questions or divulge anything you don’t
want to talk about. You can stop participating in the study at any time without penalty.
The principal investigator is taking precautions to keep your information confidential and
prevent anyone from discovering or guessing your identity, such as removing your email ad-
dress from the survey data and keeping all information on a password protected hard drive
and locked in a desk drawer.
WHAT POSSIBLE BENEFITS CAN I EXPECT FROM TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY?
Participation in this study will result in you earning $0.50 to $2.50, depending on how many
parts of the survey you complete. Otherwise, there is no direct benefit to you for participat-
ing in this study.
WHEN IS THE STUDY OVER? CAN I LEAVE THE STUDY BEFORE IT ENDS?
The study is over when you have filled out all parts of the survey. However, you can leave
the study at any time even if you haven’t finished. If you exit a survey without completing
it, you will not receive the code that you must enter on Mechanical Turk to receive your
payment.
PROTECTION OF YOUR CONFIDENTIALITY
The investigator will keep all data locked in a desk drawer in a locked office. Any electronic
or digital information will be stored on a computer that is password protected. Regulations
require that research data be kept for at least three years.
HOW WILL THE RESULTS BE USED?
The results of this study will be published in journals and presented at academic conferences.
Your name or any identifying information about you will not be published.
WHO CAN ANSWER MY QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS STUDY?
If you have any questions about taking part in this research study, you should contact the
principal investigator, David M. Houston at david.houston@tc.columbia.edu.
If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research subject, you should contact
the Institutional Review Board (IRB) (the human research ethics committee) at 212-678-
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4105 or email IRB@tc.edu. Or you can write to the IRB at Teachers College, Columbia
University, 525 W. 120th Street, New York, NY 10027. The IRB is the committee that
oversees human research protection for Teachers College, Columbia University.
PARTICIPANT’S RIGHTS
• I have read and discussed the informed consent with the researcher. I have had
ample opportunity to ask questions about the purposes, procedures, risks and benefits
regarding this research study.
• I understand that my participation is voluntary. I may refuse to participate or withdraw
participation at any time without penalty to future student status or grades.
• The researcher may withdraw me from the research at his or her professional discretion.
• If, during the course of the study, significant new information that has been developed
becomes available which may relate to my willingness to continue my participation,
the investigator will provide this information to me.
• Any information derived from the research study that personally identifies me will not
be voluntarily released or disclosed without my separate consent, except as specifically
required by law.
• I should receive a copy of the Informed Consent document.
Q1.3 This study contains two short follow-up surveys.
You will receive a link to take the first follow-up survey tomorrow. It will only take about
2-3 minutes to complete and will pay $1.00.
You will receive a link to take the second follow-up survey in 10 days. It will also only take
about 2-3 minutes to complete and will pay $1.00.
Please provide an email address to receive a link to the follow-up surveys.Your email address
will be permanently deleted from the data and will never be used for any purpose other than
sending the link to the follow-up survey.
[text field for email address]
Q1.4 How old are you?
[drop down list of ages]




Q1.6 What is your primary state of residence?
[drop down list of states]
Q1.7 In the following section, we will provide some state government performance data.
Please indicate that you’ve read the information by selecting the correct option from the
choices below.
Q2.1 The total population of [insert state here] was about in 2016. (U.S. Census Bureau)
What was the total population of [insert state here] in 2016?
[four answer choices—only one of which is correct]
Q2.2 The average unemployment rate in [insert state here] was % in 2016. (U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics)
What was the average unemployment rate in [insert state here] in 2016?
[four answer choices—only one of which is correct]
Q2.3 The median household income in [insert state here] was $ in 2015. (U.S. Census
Bureau)
What was the median household income in [insert state here] in 2015?
[four answer choices—only one of which is correct]
Q2.4 % of eligible [insert state here] residents voted in the 2016 general election for Presi-
dent of the United States. (U.S. Elections Project)
What percentage of eligible residents voted in the 2016 general election in [insert state here]?
[four answer choices—only one of which is correct]
Q2.5 [Only display if subject is in treatment group] % of eighth graders in [insert
state here] public schoolswere considered proficient in math in 2015. (National Assessment
of Educational Progress, U.S. Department of Education)
What percentage of eighth graders were considered proficient in math in [insert state here]
public schoolsin 2015?
[four answer choices—only one of which is correct]
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Q3.1 Thank you. In the following section, we will ask for your opinions on some issues in
your state.
We only have a few questions. Please take your time.
Q3.2 How confident are you in the [insert state here] public elementary and secondary school
system?
• Not at all confident
• A little confident
• Fairly confident
• Very confident
Q3.3 Do you support or oppose increasing the amount of money that [insert state here]























Q3.7 Do you support or oppose the use of publicly-funded tuition vouchers for low-income











Q3.9 How confident are you in [insert governor name here], the governor of [insert state
here]?
• Not at all confident
• A little confident
• Fairly confident
• Very confident
Q4.1 Thank you for your answers! Before you finish, please provide a little bit of information
about yourself.
Q4.2 Are you the parent/guardian of a school-aged child?
• Yes
• No
Q4.3 What is your gender?
• Male
• Female
Q4.4 Please specify your race/ethnicity:
• White
• Hispanic or Latino
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• Black or African American
• Other
Q4.5 What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed?
• Less than a high school diploma
• High school diploma
• Some college credit (no degree)
• Associate’s degree
• Bachelor’s degree or higher





Q4.7 When it comes to politics do you usually think of yourself as:
• Extremely liberal
• Slightly liberal
• Moderate or middle of the road
• Slightly conservative
• Extremely conservative
Q4.8 Thank you for participating. Please save the code on the following page to receive
$0.50 for taking this survey.
You will receive a link via email to take the first follow-up survey tomorrow at 9:00 AM
Eastern Daylight Time. The first follow-up survey will only take about 2-3 minutes and will
pay $1.00.
You will receive a link via email to take the secondfollow-up survey on Thursday, July 20th
at 9:00 AM Eastern Daylight Time. The second follow-up survey will also only take about
2-3 minutes and will pay $1.00.
Survey 2
Q1 Welcome back!
This is a follow-up survey for a study about public schools in the United States. This survey
will take about 2-3 minutes to complete. At the end of the session, you will receive a code
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to enter on Mechanical Turk to be paid $1.00.
The MTurk HIT for this survey is called:
“Follow-up survey about public schools in the United States (2-3 minutes)”




Please open the MTurk HIT in a new tab before continuing with the survey.
Q2 In the following section, we will ask for your opinions on some issues in your state.
We only have a few questions. Please take your time.
Q3 How confident are you in the [insert state here] public elementary and secondary school
system?
• Not at all confident
• A little confident
• Fairly confident
• Very confident
Q4 Do you support or oppose increasing the amount of money that [insert state here] spends






















Q8 Do you support or oppose the use of publicly-funded tuition vouchers for low-income











Q10 How confident are you in [insert governor name here], the governor of [insert state here]?
• Not at all confident
• A little confident
• Fairly confident
• Very confident
Q11 Thank you for participating. Please save the code on the following page to receive $1.00
for taking this survey.
You will receive a link via email to take the second follow-up survey on Thursday, July 20th
at 9:00 AM Eastern Daylight Time. The second follow-up survey will also only take about




This is the second follow-up survey for a study about public schools in the United States.
This survey will take about 2-3 minutes to complete. At the end of the session, you will
receive a code to enter on Mechanical Turk to be paid $1.00.
The MTurk HIT for this survey is called:
“Follow-up survey about public schools in the United States (2-3 minutes)”




Please open the MTurk HIT in a new tab before continuing with the survey.
Q2 In the following section, we will ask for your opinions on some issues in your state.
We only have a few questions. Please take your time.
Q3 How confident are you in the [insert state here] public elementary and secondary school
system?
• Not at all confident
• A little confident
• Fairly confident
• Very confident
Q4 Do you support or oppose increasing the amount of money that [insert state here] spends






















Q8 Do you support or oppose the use of publicly-funded tuition vouchers for low-income











Q10 How confident are you in [insert governor name here], the governor of [insert state here]?
• Not at all confident
• A little confident
• Fairly confident
• Very confident
Q11 Thank you for participating in this study. You have completed all three surveys.
Please save the code on the following page to receive $1.00.
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Schoolhouse Democracy: MRP Validity Checks
Figure A.1: Convergent Validity











MRP Estimates and Housing Prices































































Source: American Community Survey 2005–2007 (3 Year Estimates)
Figure A.2: Criterion Validity



















































































Source: Aggregation method pools all available data from 2000–2012
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Figure A.3: Discriminant Validity












2006 MRP Estimates (Standardized)
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